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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the last decades, the energy sector, and in particular the electricity
one, have undergone a remarkable transition around the world. The in-
creasing competition in the market, the growing penetration of renewable
generation and the pressure for decarbonisation are all part of the process.
Moreover, in Europe, the recent market coupling initiatives are paving the
road for an integrated European electricity market, and the aim is to enable
the free movement of electricity across the different power regions.
This thesis builds from this paradigm and investigates some of the most
recent changes relative to the energy market, in the general context of the
European region.
In particular, Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between the European
electricity market and the EU ETS, namely the European Union Emission
Trading System. This chapter assesses the ability of the scheme in delivering
low-carbon investments at the firm level in the electricity generation sector,
by modeling, in a real option framework, a price taker electricity producer
subject to the EU ETS jurisdiction. It also investigates the effects of a carbon
price stabilization mechanism on the timing of the investment decision.
Chapter 3 instead looks into the so-called Capacity Remuneration Mecha-
nisms, and in particular into the pricing of the reliability option, which is a
market mechanism used to ensure security of supply in electricity markets.
This tool is about to be introduced in the Italian electricity market, and this
chapter develops methodologies for its modeling and shows that, in the sim-
1
2 1. Introduction
plest contract design, the reliability option can be written as the integral of
call options on the power price, with a strike price that can be modeled either
as a fixed quantity or as a stochastic process itself (so that it represents the
marginal cost of the marginal technology used to produce electricity). The
value of the Reliability Option is simulated under a real-market calibration,
using data of the Italian power market. A sensitivity analysis finally high-
lights the impact of the power and strike price levels and of their volatility,
mean reversion speed and correlation on the Reliability Option valuation.
Finally, Chapter 4 aims at analyzing electricity flows between intercon-
nected locations in the EU, and their effect on electricity prices in the differ-
ent locations. Building from this endeavor, we then solve the optimal control
problem of an agent who uses the interconnectors to take positions in a sub-
set of locations that are part of the interconnected network. A real-market
simulation finally shows the performance of the trading strategy.
Conference presentations and Awards. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 constitute
three different papers, and each one of them has been presented at different
seminars and conferences. In particular, I am thankful to conference and
seminar participants for the helpful comments and remarks they provided
me with at the Association for Mathematics Applied to Social and Economic
Sciences 2017 meeting (AMASES), the Energy Finance Italia III conference
(EFI), and the BOMOPAV workshop, where I presented the paper relative
to Chapter 2; the University of Padova, the Energy Finance Christmas 2017
workshop (EFC17), the Workshop on Stochastics and Optimization in En-
ergy at King’s College London, the Commodity and Energy Markets Annual
Meeting (CEM18), and the 29th European Conference on Operational Re-
search (EURO18), where I presented the paper relative to Chapter 4.
Moreover, the paper relative to Chapter 4 (Optimal cross-border electricity
trading) is the result of my visiting periods at University of Oxford, where I
have been working with Professor A´lvaro Cartea on this project. This intense
and engaging period culminated with an official recognition at the Commod-
ity and Energy Markets 2018 Annual Meeting, where the paper was awarded
the General Prize for best paper.
1.1 The electricity market 3
1.1 The electricity market
After it is produced by an electricity generator, electricity flows through
transmission networks, which are run by Transmission System Operators
(TSOs). Each country can have one or more TSOs; Italy and France, for
example, have one (Terna and RTE, respectively), while Germany has four
(50 Hertz, Amprion, TenneT and TransnetBW). Finally, DSOs (Distribution
System Operators) distribute the electricity across the various households
and businesses. In Italy, for example, ENEL is the biggest DSO.
Figure 1.1: Source: Understanding electricity markets in the EU. European Parlia-
ment briefing (2016).
National transmission grids can be interconnected, meaning that electricity
can flow across national borders into another country’s grid. The physical
structures enabling this connection between two different grids are called
“interconnectors”. The recent market coupling initiatives are aimed at inte-
grating the European wholesale electricity markets, thus increasing security
of supply while reducing price volatility across Europe, and interconnectors
are at the core of the market coupling process.
The term “electricity market”, intended as a virtual space where anyone
can trade this commodity, is a relatively new concept. Citing Edwards (2009),
Prior to deregulation, only power plants owned by utilities
could sell power into a power grid. After deregulation, anyone
could build a power plant, produce power, and offer that power
for sale. In deregulated markets, utilities have shifted away from
running power plants to concentrating on operating transmission
grids. There are power plants now owned by power traders and
operated by specialized service companies. These changes revolu-
4 1. Introduction
tionized the power industry - they created a market for electrical
power.
Electricity transactions can be done over-the-counter (OTC), that is off-
exchange, directly between two parties, or on an exchange. One of the biggest
exchanges where electricity can be traded in Europe is EPEX Spot, the Euro-
pean power exchange for spot trading, covering Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and Luxembourg.
EPEX Spot operates the power spot markets for short-term trading, i.e.
the day-ahead and intra-day markets. However, another important piece of
the energy market is the forward one. The main difference among these three
markets is that, in each one of them, one can trade contracts on electricity
with a specific range of delivery times.
The forward and future market is mainly intended for hedging purposes,
and it can be over-the-counter (OTC) or a centralized exchange market.
In the latter case, it is a continuous trading market, where you can trade
contracts where the delivery of electricity is sometime in the future: weeks,
months, quarters, seasons, years.
The day-ahead market in Europe is a uniform auction system, where elec-
tricity contracts with delivery on the following day are traded. Each different
hour of delivery is a different product, so that the price of electricity deliv-
ered at, for example, 4 p.m. on the following day, is different from the one of
electricity delivered at 5 p.m. of the following day. Moreover, electricity can
also be traded in blocks, so that there are additional products, such as Block
Baseload (covering hours 1 to 24), Block Peakload (covering hours 9 a.m.
to 8 p.m.), Block Off-Peak (covering hours 9 p.m. to 8 a.m), among others.
This market closes at midday of the day before delivery is scheduled, and
demand and supply curves determine the price. In such a way, each electric-
ity producer has incentive to bid the marginal cost of production, because
if somebody else bids higher, and their aggregate supply is met by demand,
that higher bid will be the final price they both will receive.
Finally, the intra-day market in EPEX is a pay-as-bid system with contin-
uous trading, where one can trade electricity contracts with delivery on the
following or on the same day. In fact, starting from 3 p.m. on a certain day,
all hours of the following day can be traded, and each contract can be traded
until 30 minutes before delivery begins.
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As Creti and Fontini (2018) note, the two different systems governing these
last two markets, the continuous trading system and the auction one, each
have their own advantages and shortcomings. Continuous trading systems
are more efficient in presence of high liquidity, since they facilitate the order
matching. However, if liquidity is limited, they are riskier. An auction
system, on the contrary, provides a reference price, but can be inefficient as
it forces agents to wait until the end of the auction period.
1.2 Black & Gold
Oil and sunlight are two important sources of power in energy markets. These
are going to be the subject of the case study in Chapter 2.
Oil, compared to hydrocarbon gases, contains a lot of energy per unit of
volume. There are a lot of varieties of crude oil, and the most common oil
benchmarks, and most liquid, are Brent and WTI. Figure 1.2 and 1.3 show
the world total primary energy supply (TPES) by source, over different years.
Even if it decreased from 1971 to 2016, oil is still the dominant fuel.
Figure 1.2: 1971 and 2016 World total
primary energy supply (TPES) by source.
Source: IEA (2018).
Fossil fuel power plants can burn
oil to produce steam, which drives
a generator to produce electrical
power. A common measure of the ef-
ficiency of fossil fuel power plants is
the so-called ‘heat rate’, expressed as
a ratio of heat input to work output.
Oil-fired power plants are typically
not very efficient, when compared to
natural gas-fired ones. As for their
emissions, they also produce more
CO2 than natural gas-fired plants,
although they have a better emission factor than coal-fired ones (IPCC
(2006)). Fossil fuel power plants are the most influential in energy trad-
ing, since they are the marginal producers. As such, they usually set the
clearing price for power in auction markets, such as the EPEX day-ahead
one. In fact, as mentioned in the last section, in auction markets, all winning
bidders get paid the same price for the electricity they sell, regardless of their
bids.
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Figure 1.3: World total primary energy supply (TPES) by source, 1990-2015.
Source: IEA (2017b).
Solar power plants, instead, are always going to bid low in auction markets:
they require a considerable initial investment, but are very cheap to operate.
There are two types of solar power plants - photovoltaic (PV) and thermal
ones. The former are the most commonly referred to when discussing solar
power. PV plants produce direct current electricity using a sheet of solar cells
made of specialized semiconductors. In several countries in Europe, thanks
to governmental support schemes, this technology has been deployed rapidly
and, over the last few decades, there was a considerable growth in PV power.
The advantage, of course, is that they do not need any fuel to operate, and
thus they do not emit greenhouse gases.
1.3 Emission trading
Carbon emissions are another important commodity in the energy market.
Moreover, they are also a fairly recent one. In fact, over the last few years,
environmental regulation has tried to integrate the social costs entailed by
environmental pollution into the price of the products, and this was done
essentially in two ways: through command-and-control instruments or using
market-based ones.
The former instruments are the least efficient: they impose a quantitative
restriction on individual players, without taking into account the different
marginal abatement costs. On the other hand, market-based methods rep-
resent a more cost-effective alternative. Among these latter instruments,
cap-and-trade markets offer the promise of finding the lowest cost way to
decrease emissions.
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In a cap-and-trade scheme, the cap on the total emissions is set by the regu-
lator, while the price of the tradable emission permits, or carbon allowances,
is determined by the market. In such a way, the right to create pollution
becomes a tradable commodity.
Some of the first examples of these kind of systems can be traced back
to the 1980s in the US, when the Environmental Protection Agency offered
states such tools in order to control localized air pollutants. Then, in 1990,
Title IV of Clean Air Act amendments established a sulfur dioxide allowance
trading program, in order to control the acid rain issue. This was indeed one
of the first cases of successful implementation of an emission trading system
on a large scale.
Europe had to wait a bit more to have its own emission trading market, but
it can now boast the biggest one in the world, the European Emission Trading
Scheme (EU ETS), accounting for more than 75% of international carbon
trading. This was established by the European Directive 2003/87/EC, and
was launched in 2005. It covers a range of different greenhouse gases: CO2
emitted from power and heat generation, energy-intensive industry sectors
and civil aviation, N2O (nitrous oxide) from the production of acids and
PFCs (perfluorocarbons) from aluminum production.
During the first two phases of the EU ETS, allowances were freely allocated
among players, while Phase 3 (2013-2020) employs auctioning as the preferred
primary allocation method. Each European Union allowance (EUA) grants
the right to emit one tonne of CO2 equivalent. The price of these permits,
however, has been very fluctuating and subject to spikes and jumps, as it
can be seen in Figure 1.4.
Despite the extensive literature (see Chapter 2) advocating for a regula-
tory intervention in the market, this has never been implemented. Chapter
2 analyses the historical behavior of carbon prices and provides tools for
evaluating the effectiveness of the EU ETS in encouraging environmentally
conscious investments in the power generation sector. Specifically, it models
the choice of a price taker electricity producer to switch from her current
carbon-intensive power production technology to a cleaner one. This choice
is evaluated as a real option, via Least Squares Monte Carlo methods. More-
over, it also investigates the effects of a carbon price stabilization mechanism
on the electricity producer’s choice. The envisaged regulatory intervention is
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Figure 1.4: European Union Allowance spot price 2005-2017.
a price floor on carbon, and the scope of different floor levels is evaluated in
this context.
1.4 Capacity markets
Capacity markets (or capacity mechanisms) represent another policy tool
used to tackle the daunting challenge of decarbonizing electricity produc-
tion. Their goal is that of ensuring reliability needs are met in the power
system during the low-carbon transition. Moreover, these markets mitigate
the problems caused by the fact that electricity demand is highly inelastic to
prices.
There are two types of capacity mechanisms: targeted ones (for instance,
strategic reserves) and market-wide ones (reliability options). The former
mechanisms do not provide additional revenues, they are instead the only
source of revenues for the contracted capacity. The latter instead comple-
ment revenues from the sale of electricity, and are, in principle, the most effi-
cient ones. The largest and most complex capacity mechanism in the United
States is the PJM Reliability Pricing Model (RPM), which is a market-wide
mechanisms.
The US, and the American continent in general, have a long history of
capacity remuneration mechanisms, while in Europe they have become a pri-
ority for the regulator only in recent years (see Mastropietro et al. (2016)
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and references therein). As mentioned above, Chapter 3 will focus on the
Italian experience, as Italy is planning to implement a market-wide mech-
anisms, namely a reliability option one. These contacts grant their owner
the right, but not the obligation, to buy electricity from the option’s seller
at a predetermined strike price. In such a way, the sellers of a reliability
option obtain a stable revenue in exchange for which they forego possible
rents from price peaks. Thus, reliability options reduce supplier risk, while
also hedging load from high prices. These tools are particularly efficient in
that they avoid market price distortions, as they lower regulatory risk, and
can be easily adapted to meet national needs.
1.5 Cross-border transmission networks
In the perspective of a low carbon transition in the power market, invest-
ing in new transmission projects is a cost-efficient means of facilitating the
integration of high shares of intermittent renewable energy sources, and of
securing electricity supply. This is why interconnecting different electricity
markets is very high in the political agenda of the European Commission.
According to IEA (2014b), an investment of 546 billion dollars in trans-
mission networks is needed in OECD countries by 2035, making up 37% of
the total investment foreseen in renewables, networks and conventional gen-
eration. In fact, the present lack of fully interconnected macro regions also
causes the need to sometimes curtail the generation of electricity from renew-
able sources, simply because it cannot be distributed to a wider area (IEA
(2016)). The technology mix for electricity production varies a lot across
Europe. For example, hydroelectricity shares are high in Norway (96.3%
of total electricity generated in the country in 2016), Iceland (72.6%) and
Austria (61.2%), wind production is substantial in Germany (77.4 TWh in
2016) and Spain (48.9 TWh in 2016), while Germany (38.2 TWh in 2016)
and Italy (22.9 TWh in 2016) account for most of solar PV power production
in Europe (IEA (2017a)). Thus, having a fully interconnected market could
be very beneficial for the system, as it would increase the security of supply
and decrease overall costs.
Even if the urge for new interconnecting infrastructures is felt at the Eu-
ropean Commission level, the literature on interconnectors valuation is still
scarce. To our knowledge, the papers by Rosenberg et al. (2010) and Cartea
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and Gonza´lez-Pedraz (2012) are the first having undertaken this task. In
their works, they suggested to value interconnectors as a strip of real op-
tions written on the price spread between interconnected power markets, so
that, each day, each spread option can be exercised or not, depending on
its convenience. However, their analysis is static, in the sense that the way
the interconnector is used on a given day does not affect the way it will be
used on the following one. In Chapter 4, instead, we first show that traded
volumes have a direct and indirect effect on the electricity price in the differ-
ent countries, and then we provide a valuation framework based on optimal
stochastic control theory, computing the total cash flows an agent can obtain
by trading electricity contracts across interconnected locations. We do so by
considering the intra-day market.
In fact, as mentioned earlier in Section 1.1, the day-ahead and the intra-day
markets, in the European region, present a lot of different features. Moreover,
they also differ in their level of interconnectedness. In fact, the day-ahead
market is an integrated market, and prices are coupled, meaning that, pro-
vided that the interconnector capacity is enough, the price of electricity in
the two interconnected countries will be the same. Moreover, imports and
exports are implicit, in the sense that they are determined by an algorithm.
The intra-day market, instead, is not as integrated, and agents can decide to
go and buy electricity in another country, so that there could be arbitrage
opportunities. These opportunities will be explored in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2
Price dynamics in the
European Emission Trading
System and evaluation of its
ability to boost
emission-related investment
decisions ∗
In this chapter, we assess the effects of the European Union emission trad-
ing scheme (EU ETS) in delivering low-carbon investments at the firm level,
by modeling a price taker electricity producer subject to the EU ETS juris-
diction. We compute, via Least Squares Monte Carlo (LSMC) methods, the
value of the real option the greenhouse gas emitter has, consisting in the op-
portunity to switch from its current high-carbon technology to a cleaner one.
We evaluate this real option by proposing a Brennan-Schwarz model, which
exhibits positive mean-reverting prices, for fuel and a Variance Gamma (VG)
specification for carbon prices. Moreover, we further analyze the investment
decision problem, in case of a CO2 price stabilization mechanism, by explicitly
computing the expected value of the investment project by means of Fourier
∗This paper is a joint work with Tiziano Vargiolu (Universita` degli Studi di Padova).
This paper is currently under revision for an international journal.
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methods. Our results show that the introduction of a price stabilization mech-
anisms, in this case a carbon floor price, significantly affects the timing of
the investment decision, supporting emission related investments.
2.1 Introduction
In the past decades, it has become increasingly clear that a development
model heavily based on fossil fuels is hardly sustainable on the long term.
This is why the recent international environmental agreements (UNFCCC,
Kyoto Protocol) have urged countries to adopt emission reduction measures
and to invest in alternative energy projects. One of the policy tools of newest
implementation, aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, is emis-
sion trading. Such a tool is aimed at internalizing the negative externalities
generated through the production processes, by making the polluting pri-
vate firms buy a number of emission allowances, corresponding to the tons
of GHG they emit in the atmosphere.
Emission trading systems (ETS) are usually cap-and-trade schemes, in
which the regulator sets the maximum amount of CO2 and other pollut-
ing gases that can be emitted in the system, and then firms buy and trade
the emission permits on the base of their needs. Each emission permit (or
emission allowance) grants its owner the right to emit one ton of GHG.
The aim of this chapter is to give a quantitative view on the evolution of the
EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) carbon market, ana-
lyzing the emission reduction problem from the point of view of an electricity
producer running a fossil fuel-fired power plant, who is confronted with the
choice of either submitting to the ETS jurisdiction, as opposed to chang-
ing the production model, by switching production to low carbon sources of
energy.
In order to do this, taking into account the uncertainty involving future
EUA (European Union Allowance) prices and the irreversible costs connected
to a new PV plant investment, we considered the opportunity of switching
production method as a real option. Computing the price of such a real
option gives a measure of how convenient it is for the GHG emitter to shut
down the fossil fuel-fired power plant and to invest in a renewable energy
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project. We focused on an oil-fired power plant, and we chose PV energy as
the alternative source of energy considered.
Section 2.2 places this work in the relevant literature on the subject. The
first part of Section 2.3 presents the model and the methodology. Pricing
a real option requires consistently defining the price dynamics of the under-
lying assets, and this is why the second part of Section 2.3 is devoted to
analyzing the EUA spot prices, in order to define a stochastic process able to
consistently replicate their trend over time. Section 2.4 presents the results
and conducts a sensitivity analysis. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Relevant Literature
Since the European Union carbon market was established, in 2005, the un-
certainty related to the magnitude of compliance costs and to the impact of
this type of climate policy on the power sector has motivated some research
on this field. Some of the early contributions can be traced back to Lau-
rikka and Koljonen (2006) and Szolgayova et al. (2008). Both papers use
stochastic carbon and electricity prices and deterministic fuel prices. While
the former investigates how emission-related uncertainty affects the value of
an option to invest in a coal powered plant as opposed to that of investing
in a gas-fired power plant, the latter analyzes the effects of a cap on the
carbon price, concluding that it would jeopardize the incentive to phase in
low-carbon technologies. Both of them investigated the implications of the
EU ETS by means of a real option analysis, but did so at a time when the
EU carbon market was still very young and unstable, so historical data were
relatively short.
As time went by, the magnitude of the downward risk in the EU ETS
started to motivate some research aimed at discussing the effects of bounding
carbon prices by means of a regulatory minimum price for EU allowances.
The theoretical studies by Weber and Neuhoff (2010), Gru¨ll and Taschini
(2011) and Wood and Jotzo (2011) act in this sense, analyzing the possibility
of enhancing the incentives provided by the EU ETS, by introducing a CO2
price floor. Their results suggest that establishing a regulatory minimum
price would be advisable in many respects.
The papers by Abadie et al. (2011) and Brauneis et al. (2013) incorporate
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the possibility of such a political intervention in their real option analysis, to
assess its effects on the firm-level investment decisions. The former employs
a binomial lattice model to compute the value of the option to abandon a
coal-fired power plant and advocates a price stabilization mechanisms in the
form of floor price. The latter, instead, uses the least-squares Monte Carlo
approach to solve the optimization problem of decision making in case of
an electricity producer who has the option to replace the existing coal-fired
power plant with a “clean” nuclear one. Brauneis et al. (2013), moreover,
compute the floor price required to trigger investment in the new low-carbon
plant, and propose a number of different designs for the floor price.
In this work, we propose an extension to the model by Brauneis et al.
(2013), introducing a different stochastic process, both for fuel and carbon
prices, in place of the geometric brownian motion (GBM). In fact, unlike
other financial products, which all fall into a precise asset category (equity,
fixed income, FX, commodities, derivatives), carbon is a special asset which
may resemble energy commodities in some aspects but differentiates itself
in others, in the sense that its price somewhat depends on an exogenous
political decision, which caps the total supply of the product. This aspect
reflects in the price distribution, featuring extreme events such as jumps
in the price process, as well as heavy tails and leptokurtic behavior in the
distribution. The majority of the papers on the ETS subject have used, for
ease of modeling, GBM processes to describe the EUA price behavior (cfr.
Szolgayova et al. (2008), Abadie et al. (2011), Yang et al. (2008), Brauneis
et al. (2013), among others). Instead, we propose a different specification
for the allowances price, namely a Variance Gamma (VG) process, which,
to our knowledge, has never been used to model carbon prices. Moreover,
we further analyze the investment decision problem in case of a CO2 price
stabilization mechanism, by explicitly computing the expected value of the
investment project by means of Fourier methods.
2.3 Methodology
We consider a price taker and risk neutral power generating firm, operating
a “dirty” electricity generation technology in Italy.1 Being subject to the EU
1Choosing a specific geographic region where to base our project is just a tool for
consistently defining the technical characteristics and output of the new plant, powered
by renewable sources. Nevertheless, our model can be used for different geographical
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ETS jurisdiction, the firm has either to buy the necessary EUAs to run its
business, or it can decide to switch production model towards more sustain-
able energy sources, in order to avoid the compliance costs. Specifically, we
decided to choose photovoltaic (PV) technology as a case study. In fact, solar
production has experienced a consistent growth in Italy over the last years,
accounting for the highest share of incremental production from renewable
energies in the period 2002-2015, going from only 677 GWh in 2009, topping
22,900 GWh in 2015 (GSE (2017)). In order to reduce the dimensionality of
the problem, we suppose that the two alternative plants, the ”clean” and the
”dirty” one, produce the same amount of electricity per year. In this way,
when evaluating the real option, we get rid of the electricity price variable.
We thus chose to model the firm as an oil-fired plant with a comparable ca-
pacity to that of the alternative solar one. The technical characteristics of
the firm at t = 0 are reported in Table 2.1.2
2.3.1 The investment decision problem
At the beginning of each period, until the end of its economic life, the com-
pany can choose to replace the existing power plant with another one, based
on PV technology, with no carbon emissions. Given the fact that this deci-
sion (1) can be taken at any moment in time prior to the end of the economic
life of the oil-fired power plant, (2) is irreversible in that it implies high sunk
costs (decommissioning of the existing plant and construction of the PV one),
and (3) is affected by the uncertainty related to some key variables, such as
the price of CO2 and that of fuels, this choice can be modeled as a real op-
tion, to which a value can be given, in a very similar way to the one in which
financial options are priced. The pricing process of a real option has received
an in depth treatment in the seminal text by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) on
real option theory. It is possible to use two different methods: dynamic
programming, in which the investment problem is formulated in terms of a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and solved by backward induction, using
a discount rate reflecting the opportunity cost of capital for similarly risky
investments, or contingent claims analysis, which consists in constructing a
riskless replicating portfolio of existing traded assets able to indeed replicate
locations.
2We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for the computation of some of the values in the
table.
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Table 2.1: Technical characteristics of the oil-fired power plant.
Variable Unit Value
Capacity MW 10
Residual lifetime years 25
Capacity factor∗ rate 80%
Efficiency¶ rate 40%
Electricity produced kWh/year 7.01 ·107
Fuel consumption tons/year 1.48·104
CO2 emission factor tons/kWh 2.64·10−4
CO2 emissions per year tons/year 46,200
Operating & maintenance costs million EUR/year 0.5
Decommissioning costs million EUR 1
∗ The capacity factor is the ratio of a power station actual generation to its
maximum potential generation. This value represents the theoretical
capacity factor of an oil-fired power station in good condition. In Italy
there are some examples of fuel oil plants which have been running in full
swing over the recent years: the Livorno Marzocco power plant, Tuscany,
operating since 1965, in 2007 had a capacity factor of 79%
(see http://enipedia.tudelft.nl/wiki/Livorno Powerplant).
¶ The efficiency of a power station is a percentage measure given by the
ratio between the electricity produced and the heat energy needed in
order to produce it. According to IEA (2008), the average efficiency of
oil-fired electricity production in Italy, over the 2001-2005 period, was
41%. For ease of calculation, 40% is taken as a proxy.
the return of the claim we are trying to give a value to. Being riskless, such
a portfolio earns a risk-free rate of return. Both methods are in principle
analytical ones, in which an explicit formula for the option value should be
retrieved, by solving a partial integral differential equation (PIDE) subject
to two key boundary conditions, the value-matching and the smooth-pasting
ones; in practice, it is often not possible to do so, and instead of finding
a closed-form solution, numerical methods are employed, as is the case in
our model. As a computational method of choice, given that we model our
two relevant state variables with different stochastic processes, and given the
complexity of the VG one, we chose to implement a Least Squares Monte
Carlo (LSMC) simulation rather than a simpler binomial tree for efficiency
purposes.
The optimization procedure starts by defining the relevant state variables,
choosing a stochastic process for each one of them, and calibrating such pro-
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cesses on historical data. Using those fitted processes, Monte Carlo methods
are then employed to simulate paths for the relevant state variables. We
then match this simulation to a dynamic programming algorithm, in order
to compare the expected outcome of investing in the PV plant (that is, ex-
ercising the option), with the one obtained by postponing the decision for
an additional period. By taking the maximum between the immediate in-
vestment net present value (NPV) and the NPV obtained by delaying the
decision, we find the optimal exercise decision at any point in time.
In case the firm decides to invest in the alternative energy plant, it will have
to pay for the decommissioning of the oil-fired plant, whose cost is reported in
Table 2.1. Given the negligible construction time of PV plants, we assumed
the switching decision to have immediate effect. We further assumed the PV
plant to have an economic lifetime of 25 years (average economic lifetime of
PV plants according to IEA (2014a)).
Once defined the total electricity output produced in the entire lifetime of
the solar plant, the investment required to build it is expressed by the lev-
elised cost of electricity (LCOE) of PV technology, an indicator summarizing
the various costs related to building and operating a power station. Taking
into account the benefits given by the so-called “learning curves” over time,
the LCOE is modeled as a decreasing exponential, as seen in Biondi and
Moretto (2015):
LCOE(t) = LCOE(0) eαCt (2.3.1)
where αC < 0 is the product between the negative learning curve coefficient
and the average growth rate of the PV industry.
The real option, thus, has a strike price K equal to the sunk costs the firm
incurs once it decides to invest:
K(t) = c+Q · LCOE(t),
where c represents the decommissioning cost of the high-carbon plant, and
Q is the total electricity produced over the PV plant lifetime. On the other
hand, exercising the option grants Φ, which represents the conditional ex-
pected value of the savings the company obtains by investing in the clean
technology plant, discounted with a risk-free factor r, and summed up from
the moment when the investment takes place, t, until the end of the model
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horizon, T :
Φ(Dt, Pt, t) = E
Q
[∫ T
t
BDs e
−r(s−t) ds +
∫ T
t
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−r(s−t) ds+
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Op e−r(s−t) ds
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[
Op e−r(s−t)
∣∣ Ft] ds+K(T ) Tpv − (T − t)
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(2.3.2)
where D is the oil spot price, P is the carbon spot price, which are multi-
plied respectively by the fuel consumption coefficient of the oil-fired plant B,
and by its yearly CO2 emissions X, while Op represents the operating and
maintenance costs of the high-carbon technology plant. The model horizon is
set to coincide with the residual economic lifetime of the fossil fuel-powered
plant (25 years). If the end of the model horizon does not also coincide with
the end of the economic lifetime of the low-carbon plant (Tpv), in t = T , the
existing plant is sold for its book value, and an additional positive cash flow
is given.
The real option R to defer the investment is thus an American call option
on the value of the project:
R(Pt, Dt, t) = max
τ
E
[
e−r(τ−t) (Φ(Dτ , Pτ , τ)−K(τ))
]
where the maximum is taken over all stopping times τ with t < τ < T . To
compute the value of the option, first we solved the expression for Φ. Since
the solution of (2.3.2) depends on the choice of the relevant state variables
dynamics, defined in the following section, we refer the reader to Section
2.3.3 for the closed-form solution of the expression in (2.3.2).
Once the payoff given by exercising the option is computed at each point
in time, an efficient exercise rule is to assess the convenience of investing in
the project as opposed to deferring the investment at every point in time
when the decision has to be made. We followed the procedure outlined in
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001), where the estimate of the continuation value,
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that is the value given by deferring the investment decision to the following
period, is computed through a least-squares Monte Carlo simulation. Follow-
ing Brauneis et al. (2013), we defined a quadratic relationship between the
value of continuing, CVt,i, and the value our relevant simulated variables as-
sume at each time the investment decision has to be made, where i indicates
the different Monte Carlo simulated paths and t ∈ [0, T ]:
CVt,i = αt + β1Dt,i + β2Pt,i + β3(Dt,i)
2 + β4(Pt,i)
2 + t,i. (2.3.3)
Through the least-squares analysis, we determined the regression coefficients
providing the best fit. Using these estimated coefficients and working back-
wards, at each point in time the payoff given by exercising the option is
compared to the continuation value.
Policy intervention: the carbon price floor
The procedure as outlined above represents the baseline scenario, without
policy interventions. If instead we want to include a price stabilization mech-
anism in the model, we need to reconsider (2.3.2). In fact, in presence of a
floor F on EUA prices, we need to consider max (Ps , F ) in place of Ps in
Equation (2.3.2). It can be noticed that
max (Ps , F ) = Ps + (F − Ps)+ . (2.3.4)
and that the new benefits equation ΦF becomes
ΦF (Dt, Pt, t) =
∫ T
t
EQ
[
BDs e
−r(s−t)∣∣ Ft] ds+
+X
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) EQ
[
Ps + (F − Ps)+
∣∣ Ft] ds+
+
∫ T
t
EQ
[
Op e−r(s−t)
∣∣ Ft] ds+K(T ) Tpv − (T − t)
Tpv
e−r(T−t)
(2.3.5)
Bounding carbon prices downwards, thus, is equivalent to having a put option
with the floor F as strike price, and the solution to (2.3.5) is again the solution
to (2.3.2), plus the integral on [t, T ] of the price of such a put option.
To compute the value of this option, we employed Fourier inversion as the
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computational method of choice. The Fourier method is efficient in presence
of a complex or unknown probability density function of the underlying as-
set, provided that its characteristic function is analytically tractable Pascucci
(2011). This is the case for the VG process, which, as stated above, is the
specification of choice for the carbon price. Starting from Carr and Madan
(1999), other authors (e.g. Lee (2004)) have used and extended Fourier trans-
form methods in option pricing. The main idea is to use the Fourier inversion
formula on the payoff function of the option, and then, after changing the
integration order by Fubini’s theorem, one can insert in the pricing formula
the characteristic function of the desired underlying process under the se-
lected equivalent martingale measure (EMM) Q. Of course, a problem arises
when the payoff of the option is non-integrable, since the classical Fourier
transform
Φ(u) =
∫
R
eiuxf(x) dx
is only defined for f ∈ L1(R). This happens even for vanilla options like calls
or puts, but the problem can be solved, as Carr and Madan (1999) show,
by damping, or penalizing, the payoff function. While they operate on the
function in order to make it decay as logF → −∞, we follow Pascucci (2011)
in order to make the payoff function decay as the underlying goes to +∞.
Let us then define the damped function as:
fγ(x) = e
−γxf(x), γ ∈ R.
In this way, we have that the damped payoff of the call is fCγ (x) = e
−γx (ex − F )+,
and the damped payoff of the put is fPα (x) = e
−γx (F − ex)+, and we can see
that fCγ ∈ L1(R) for γ > 1 and fPγ ∈ L1(R) for γ < 0.
Following the procedure outlined above, we obtain the following formula for
the put option price (Pascucci (2011)):
Price(Pt, F, T ) =
e−r(T−t)P γt F
1−γ
pi
∫ ∞
0
e−iu log
Pt
F
φXT (−(u+ iγ))
(iu− γ)(iu− γ + 1) du
(2.3.6)
where φXT (u) is the characteristic function, under the selected EMM Q, of
the underlying price process, which in our case, is a VG. This formula returns
both the price of a call, when γ > 1, and that of a put, when γ < 0.
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The LCOE of PV technology
As stated above, the LCOE is a synthetic indicator summarizing the unitary
cost of electricity production related to a certain technology. In our case,
it depends on a number of factors, including the price of PV modules, the
capacity factor of the plant, and the installation, maintenance, insurance
and decommissioning costs. Due to the uncertainty related to government
incentives, we did not include them in our analysis. To estimate the cur-
rent LCOE and the LCOE parameter αC we mentioned above, we first need
to estimate the magnitude of the costs outlined above and to compute the
learning curve coefficient and the average growth rate of the PV industry, as
αC is the product of the two.
The learning curve coefficent. According to Fraunhofer ISE (2015), the
learning rate LR of PV industry ranges between 0.19 and 0.23. We took the
average 0.21 as a proxy. The economic meaning of such a value is that, each
time the cumulated capacity doubles, the unitary cost decreases by 21%.
Given that the progress ratio PR, that is the cost improvement at each
doubling of cumulated capacity, is equal to 1− LR, we get that PR = 0.79.
Since the learning curve coefficient is defined as logPR
log 2
, it is equal to -0.34.
Growth rate of PV the industry. According to Fraunhofer ISE (2015),
in a pessimistic scenario the 2015-2050 compound annual growth rate will
be 5%, in the intermediate scenario it will be 7.5%, while, in the optimistic
one, the growth rate will be 10%. We took 7.5% as a proxy. The LCOE
parameter αC is thus equal to -0.0255.
The current cost of PV technology. Since the plant will be built in Italy,
we assume an average full load hours value of 1250 kWh/kW, which corre-
sponds to a 14.3% capacity factor. As for the cost estimates, Fraunhofer ISE
(2015) provides an estimate of the costs of a 1 MW PV utility in Germany,
related to 2014. We use them to compute the LCOE relative to year 2014,
and then update it to year 2017 with the exponential relationship mentioned
above. The LCOE relative to 2014, resulting from these assumptions, is
equal to 0.087 AC/kWh. Thus, according to (2.3.1), the LCOE for 2017 is
0.081 AC/kWh.
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2.3.2 Price modeling
In what follows, we model the two relevant stochastic variables, carbon and
oil spot prices, with two different specifications. The correlation between
EUA and WTI crude oil prices is assumed to be equal to zero, given its
very volatile nature over time, and following Chevallier (2012), who finds
the time-varying correlation between these two variables is comprised in the
range [−0.05; 0.05].
Carbon price
EU carbon prices have followed a particular path over time. A huge drop in
prices towards the end of 2007 marked the transition between the first and
the second trading phase. In fact, the first phase was conceived as a sort of
trial stage, used for “learning by doing”: soon the market realized that the
number of allowances was excessive and the price fell to zero in 2007. The
second trading phase was then launched with an adjusted cap (and the possi-
bility of banking permits was introduced), but the 2008 financial crisis deeply
affected the price development, leading to declining and unstable prices. We
are currently in the third carbon trading phase, but the price behavior is still
marked by high price uncertainty. As Gru¨ll and Kiesel (2012) show, the high
price sensitivity of permits and their proneness to jumps are structural fea-
tures of the EU ETS in its present configuration. For these reasons, a simple
GBM model does not seem appropriate to describe carbon prices, and the
data analysis supports this conjecture: the chi-squared goodness of fit test
on log-returns gives an extremely low p-value (7.76 ·10−10) and the null hy-
pothesis of normality is rejected at the 5% significance level. This is mainly
due to the pronounced leptokurtic behavior of the log-return distribution,
which causes the high peakedness about the mean and lack of shoulders.
These characteristics suggest another stochastic process to model this vari-
able, the Variance Gamma (VG) one, originally proposed by Madan et al.
(1998). The VG process is obtained by subordinating (i.e. time-changing)
a Brownian motion by a Gamma process Tt with i.i.d. increments, so that
the final process has bounded variation and infinite activity. In this way, the
carbon spot price Pt is modeled as:
Pt = P0 e
µt+θPTt+σPB(Tt) (2.3.7)
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where P0 is the initial price, µ, θP ∈ R, σP ∈ R+ and Tt ∼ Γ(αt, α) is a
Gamma process.
As we can see in the bottom panels of Figure 2.1, the VG process graphi-
cally fits the data on spot carbon prices better than the GBM; the chi-squared
goodness of fit test confirms this visual intuition, indicating that the test does
not reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level, with a p-value equal
to 0.44. The estimated carbon parameters are reported in Table 2.2.
Parameter Estimated value
µˆ −5.09 · 10−4
σˆP 0.030
θˆP −3.59 · 10−9
αˆ 0.935
Table 2.2: Estimated parameters for carbon spot data fitted via MLE using a VG
model.
Oil price
In commodity markets, a widely accepted assumption is that of mean revert-
ing spot prices (see for example Lutz (2010)). Thus, we chose a Brennan-
Schwartz (BS) process for the WTI crude oil spot price D(t):
dD(t) = k(θD(t)−D(t)) dt+ σDD(t) dW (t) (2.3.8)
where k is the speed of reversion toward the mean, θD is the long run mean
price level, σD is the volatility of the process and dW (t) is the increment of
a Wiener process. The estimated oil parameters are reported in Table 2.3.
Parameter Estimated value
kˆ 0.0014
θˆD 445.64
σˆD 0.025
Table 2.3: Estimated parameters for WTI crude oil spot data fitted via MLE using
a BS model.
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Figure 2.1: Variance-Gamma vs. Normal fit on EUA spot prices, listed at the European Energy Exchange (EEX).
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2.3.3 The real option payoff - A closed-form solution
Baseline scenario
Given the price dynamics in the previous section, we can now provide the
solution to (2.3.2) (we refer the reader to the Appendix A.2 for the detailed
procedure):
Φ(Dt, Pt, t) =BDt
1− e−(T−t)(r+k)
r + k
+
kB ert
r + k
∫ T
t
θD(u)
[
e−ru − e−rT−k(T−u)] du
+X Pt (T − t) + Op
r
(
1− e−r(T−t))
+K(T )
Tpv − (T − t)
Tpv
e−r(T−t)
(2.3.9)
Regulatory intervention scenario
As Madan et al. (1998) show, the characteristic function for the VG process
is
ϕXT (u) = E
[
eiuXT
]
= eiµTu
(
1− iθP u
α
+
1
2
σ2P
u2
α
)−Tα
(2.3.10)
As shown in Appendix A.2, as a necessary condition for (2.3.10) to be under
the EMM Q, we need to have
µ = r + α log
(
1− θ +
1
2
σ2
α
)
. (2.3.11)
Looking back at (2.3.5), and using (2.3.6) along with (2.3.10), we get that
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the value of the put is:
X
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) EQ
[
(F − Ps)+
∣∣ Ft] ds =
= X
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)P γt F
1−γ
pi
·
·
∫ +∞
0
e−iu log
Pt
F
+µ(s−t)(γ−iu)
(
1 + iθP
u+iγ
α
+ 1
2
σ2P
(u+iγ)2
α
)−(s−t)α
(iu− γ)(iu− γ + 1) du ds =
= X
P γt F
1−γ
pi
∫ +∞
0
e−iu log
Pt
F
(iu− γ)(iu− γ + 1)
[
e(T−t)m(u) − 1
m(u)
]
du (2.3.12)
where
m(u) = −r − iµ(u+ iγ)− α log
(
1 + iθP
u+ iγ
α
+
1
2
σ2P
(u+ iγ)2
α
)
,
with µ satisfying (2.3.11). In this way,
ΦF (Dt, Pt, t) = Φ(Dt, Pt, t) +X
P γt F
1−γ
pi
·
·
∫ +∞
0
e−iu log
Pt
F
(iu− γ)(iu− γ + 1)
[
e(T−t)m(u) − 1
m(u)
]
du (2.3.13)
Choice of the damping parameter
Even if, theoretically, equation (2.3.6) is valid for any γ < 0, many authors
have noticed that the integrand in the pricing formula may be oscillatory or
highly peaked, depending on the choice of γ.
As a criterion for the selection of the damping parameter, we plot the in-
tegrand in (2.3.6) as a function of the different variables, and examine the
graphs in order to detect oscillatory behaviors.
For example, as we can see in Figure 2.2, the more the maturity increases,
the smaller γ needs to be. According to our graphical results, with the es-
timated VG parameters, an optimal choice for γ lies in the interval [−1, 0).
Specifically, we chose γ = −0.8.
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(a) T = 2, γ ∈ [−5, 0] (b) T = 20, γ ∈ [−1.5, 0]
Figure 2.2: Integrand for the VG model with the estimated parameters.
2.4 Results
This section discusses the results obtained using our model. In what follows,
we use an initial market price for oil of 54.00 $ per barrel (365.73 AC/ton),
and an initial carbon price of 5.05 AC/ton of CO2. We use a risk-free annual
interest rate r equal to 2.5%. All other parameters are as stated in the
previous sections. The results are shown in terms of expected value of the
option (computed as the average of the values on all simulated paths) and
of cumulative investment probability, defined as the sum of the number of
paths in which the investment takes place before a certain year, over the
total number of simulated paths. We run our model on Matlab, with 10,000
simulated paths.
2.4.1 Baseline scenario
Using the parameters stated above, and assuming no policy interventions
in the carbon market, the probability to invest in the clean energy project
before 10 years reaches 50%. Before the end of the model horizon, the optimal
strategy consists in replacing the oil-fired power plant in 92% of the cases
(Fig. 2.3a, dashed purple line).
This result, however, is quite sensitive to the choice of the discount rate r,
as shown in Fig. 2.3. If r is higher than the one assumed in our model, the in-
vestment probability shifts downward and the expected option value declines.
On the contrary, the lower the discount rate, the higher the probability of
switching production method, with r = 1% suggesting almost immediate
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investment.
As a second sensitivity test, we looked at the impact that different long term
mean prices for oil θD could have on the optimal timing of the investment. We
thus run our model with a set of different θD, corresponding to a reduction
or increase of 3%, 6% or 9% with respect to the initial θD estimate. Figure
2.4 shows, as we would expect, that having higher long term mean values for
oil prices results in earlier investment for a given probability value, and this
is contextual to an increase in the expected option value. An increase in θD
of 9% with respect to our estimate leads to a probability of 100% that it is
optimal to exercise the option before the end of the model horizon. On the
other hand, a decrease of 9% in the same initial value results in a decrease
by 20% in the corresponding probability.
(a) Cumulative switches (b) Expected option value
Figure 2.3: Sensitivity analysis of the results using different annual risk-free interest
rates r.
2.4.2 Regulatory intervention scenario
The impact of introducing a minimum price for EU emission allowances is
shown in Fig. 2.5 and 2.6. In Fig. 2.5 and 2.6a, we show the results on
the investment probability and on the expected option value, respectively, of
having a carbon floor price equal to {10, 20, 30, 40} AC/ ton of CO2. As the
floor gets higher, the number of simulation runs in which it is convenient to
invest in the clean energy project increases for each point in time, and the
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(a) Cumulative switches (b) Expected option value
Figure 2.4: Sensitivity analysis of the results using different long term means θD for
oil.
option to replace the “dirty” technology with a “clean” one appreciates in
value. Specifically, with a floor of 10 AC, that is slightly above the current
market price (as of February 2018), the probability that exercising the real
option before 10 years is optimal shifts from about 50% to almost 80%. With
a floor as high as 20 AC/ton, in about 55% of the cases it is optimal to invest
immediately in the project, and the probability rises to 100% if the floor is
30 AC/ton.
Finally, we run again our model using two different risk-free interest rates
r, and the results, reported in Fig. 2.7, confirm the positive effect of a floor
on carbon prices.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we evaluated the impact of the EU ETS on renewable en-
ergy investments in the power generation sector, by extending the model in
Brauneis et al. (2013).
As our case study is based in Italy, and given the country’s consistent
share of PV energy production over the total incremental renewable energy
generation over the last years (as explained in the previous sections), we
chose PV technology as the alternative production method of the electricity
producer, currently running a fossil fuel-fired power plant. After having
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Figure 2.5: Investment probability evolution over the years with different carbon
floor prices, r=2.5%.
(a) Expected option value (b) 5th and 95th percentiles for the
benefits equation Φ and for the value
of the put given in presence of a floor
= 10.
Figure 2.6: Results in presence of a carbon floor price, r=2.5%.
analyzed the statistical features of carbon prices, we found a VG process was
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(a) Cumulative switches, r=2% (b) Expected option value, r=2%
(c) Cumulative switches, r=3% (d) Expected option value, r=3%
Figure 2.7: Sensitivity analysis of the results with a floor, using different annual
risk-free interest rates r.
particularly suited for best fitting EUA price data. The other relevant state
variable in our model, fossil fuel price, was modeled according to a mean-
reverting stochastic process, as is usual practice for energy commodities:
specifically, we chose a Brennan-Schwartz dynamics. Through a Monte Carlo
simulation, we then generated a number of paths for each state variable.
After defining the payoff function of the option to replace the current power
plant with a PV one, we used a dynamic programming approach in order to
assess the optimal switching time on each path. Specifically, we used LSMC
as the computational method of choice. We also assessed the impact of a
regulatory intervention in the EU ETS, in the form of a floor price on carbon
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allowances. To do so, we computed the expected value of the investment
project, by means of Fourier methods.
Our results show that a minimum CO2 price of 30 AC/ton of CO2 would
trigger immediate investment in the clean energy plant, and this result is
quite robust to changes in the risk-free interest rate. On the other hand,
without regulatory interventions, only in 50% of the simulated paths the
optimal decision consists in exercising the option before 10 years.
Thus, according to the results of our model, a pure carbon trading system
has a limited impact on renewable energy investments, and a policy inter-
vention in the EU ETS seems advisable. Through a floor price, one of the
goals of the EU ETS, namely boosting low-carbon investments in the power
generation sector, could be achieved. Such a price management mechanism
has already been implemented in the UK, as well as in three other emission
trading programs, the northeastern US Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), the California emission trading program and the Quebec one. The
floor is implemented as a minimum bid in auctions, and, in all these three
programs, it has been successful in enhancing environmental outcomes. The
present work confirms the positive impact that such a policy intervention
could have.
2.6 Appendix A
A.1 Technical characteristics of the oil-fired power plant
Given the capacity and the capacity factor values reported in Table 2.1 (10
MW and 80%, respectively), the yearly electricity output is computed:
Electricity output = 10, 000 kW · 0.8 · 365 · 24h = 7.01 · 107 kWh/year.
The corresponding amount of energy needed to produce such an output is
retrieved by simply dividing the electricity output by the efficiency rate of the
plant (40%, as reported in Table 2.1), which results in 1.75·108 kWh/year.
Given that the calorific value of crude oil is 42.5 MJ/kg, or 11,800 kWh/ton,
the fuel consumption of the oil-fired plant is computed:
Fuel consumption =
1.75 · 108 kWh/year
11, 800 kWh/ton
= 1.48 · 104 tons/year.
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As stated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the default
CO2 emission factor for crude oil is 73,300 kg/TJ IPCC (2006), or 2.64 ·
10−4 tons/kWh (since 1 kWh = 3.6 MJ). The yearly carbon emissions are
thus given by:
CO2 emissions = 1.75·108 kWh/year · 2.64·10−4 tons/kWh = 46, 200 tons/year.
A.2 Solving the benefits equation
The oil spot price
The oil spot price follows a Brennan-Schwartz process, defined as
dD(t) = k(θD(t)−D(t)) dt+ σDD(t) dW (t) (A.1)
To solve this stochastic differential equation (SDE), let us first consider the
dynamics without the terms which do not depend on D(t):
dD0(t) = −kD0(t) dt+ σDD0(t) dB(t), D0(0) = d0 > 0 (A.2)
We can solve this SDE using Ito¯’s formula:
D0(t) = D0(0) e
−(k+ 12σ2D)t+σDB(t) (A.3)
We now search for a solution to Equation (A.1), of the formD(t) = D0(t)Y (t).
Applying Ito¯ to Y (t) = D(t)/D0(t), we get:
dY (t) = d
(
D(t)
D0(t)
)
=
= Y ′t + Y
′
D1
dD + Y ′D0dD0+
+
1
2
(
δ2Y
δD2
(dD)2 + 2
δ2Y
δDδD0
dDdD0 +
δ2Y
δD20
(dD0)
2
)
=
=
1
D0(t)
dD(t)− D(t)
D20(t)
dD0(t)+
+
1
2
(
− 2
D20(t)
dD(t)dD0(t) + 2
D(t)
D30(t)
σ2DD
2
0(t)dt
)
=
=
kθD(t)
D0(t)
dt
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⇒ D(t)
D0(t)
=
D(0)
D0(0)
+
∫ t
0
kθD(s)
D0(s)
ds
So we have
D(t) = D0(t)
[
D(0)
D0(0)
+
∫ t
0
kθD(s)
D0(s)
ds
]
(A.4)
where D0(t) is given by eq. (A.3), and, more in general,
D(t) = D0(t)
[
D(t0)
D0(t0)
+
∫ t
t0
kθD(s)
D0(s)
ds
]
(A.5)
with s > t > 0.
Solving Φ(Dt, Pt, t)
We can now use equation (A.5) to solve (2.3.2), the equation for Φ.
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• Let us begin by solving the first expected value block:∫ T
t
E [BDs e
−r(s−t) | Ft] ds =
= B
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t) E [Ds|Ft ] ds =
= B
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
{
D1(t) E
[
e−(k+
1
2
σ2D)(s−t)+σD[B(s)−B(t)]
∣∣∣ Ft]
+ E
[
e−(k+
1
2
σ2D)(s−t)+σD[B(s)−B(t)]
·
∫ s
t
k θD(u)
e−(k+
1
2
σ2D)(u−t)+σD[B(u)−B(t)]
du
∣∣∣∣Ft ]} ds =
= B
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
{
Dt E
[
e−(k+
1
2
σ2D)(s−t)+σD(B(s)−B(t))
]
(A.6)
+
∫ s
t
E
[
k θD(u) e
−(k+ 12σ2D)(s−u)+σD(B(s)−B(u))
]
du
}
ds = (A.7)
= B
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
{
Dt e
−k(s−t) +
∫ s
t
k θD(u) e
−k(s−u) du
}
ds =
(A.8)
= BDt
1− e−(T−t)(r+k)
r + k
+ kB
∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
∫ s
t
θD(u) e
−k(s−u) du ds =
= BDt
1− e−(T−t)(r+k)
r + k
+
kB ert
r + k
∫ T
t
θD(u)
[
e−ru − e−rT−k(T−u)] du
(A.9)
where (A.6) and (A.7) follow from independence of B(s) − B(t) on the fil-
tration Ft, while (A.8) is computed using the characteristic function of a
Normal random variable. In case θD is constant, we get that (A.9) is equal
to:
B
[
1− e−(T−t)(r+k)
r + k
(Dt − θD) + θD
r
(
1− e−r(T−t))] .
As for the second expected value block, let us recall that
Pt = P0 e
µt+θPTt+σPB(Tt)
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where Tt has i.i.d. gamma increments, with Tt ∼ Γ(αt, α).
To price in a risk-neutral setting, we need to impose a restriction on the
parameters, in order for the the discounted price to be a martingale. Specif-
ically, for t < s, we need
E
[
e−rsPs
∣∣ Ft] = e−rtPt . (A.10)
We have
E
[
e−rsPs
∣∣ Ft] = e−rs P0 E [eµs+θPTs+σPB(Ts)∣∣ Ft] =
= e−rsP0 E
[
eµs+θP (Ts−Tt+Tt)+σP (B(Ts)−B(Tt)+B(Tt))
∣∣ Ft] =
= e−rs−µt Pt E
[
E
[
eµs+θP (Ts−Tt)+σP (B(Ts)−B(Tt))
∣∣ F ∗t ]∣∣ Ft] =
(A.11)
= e−rs+µ(s−t) Pt E
[
e(θP+
1
2
σ2P )(Ts−Tt)
∣∣∣ Ft] = (A.12)
= Pt e
−rs+µ(s−t)
(
1− θP +
1
2
σ2P
α
)−α(s−t)
= (A.13)
= e−rtPt e(µ−r)(s−t)
(
1− θP +
1
2
σ2P
α
)−α(s−t)
where (A.11) follows from the “tower”, or repeated expectation, property. In
fact, we define Ft as the information available up until time t, that is
Ft = σ ({B(u), u ≤ Tt} , {Tu, u ≤ t}) ,
while F ∗t is defined as
F ∗t = σ ({B(u), u ≤ Tt} , {Tu, u ≤ T}) ,
so that Ft ⊂ F ∗t . (A.12) follows again from the moment generating function
of a Normal random variable and (A.13) follows from the moment generating
function of the gamma density, with α > θP +
1
2
σ2P which ensures the equation
is finite.
Thus, for (A.10) to hold, we need to have
e(µ−r)(s−t)
(
1− θP +
1
2
σ2P
α
)−α(s−t)
= 1.
2.6 Appendix A 37
The necessary condition is then
µ = r + α log
(
1− θ +
1
2
σ2
α
)
(A.14)
and the second expected value block becomes∫ T
t
EQ
[
XPs e
−r(s−t)∣∣ Ft] ds = X ∫ T
t
e rt e−rtPt ds =
= X Pt (T − t) . (A.15)
The solution to the third expected value block is trivial:∫ T
t
EQ [Op e−r(s−t)
∣∣Ft ] ds = Op
r
(
1− e−r(T−t)) (A.16)
Putting together equations (A.9), (A.15) and (A.16), we have the solution
for (2.3.2), given in (2.3.9).
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Chapter 3
Pricing Reliability Options
under different electricity price
regimes ∗
Reliability Options are capacity remuneration mechanisms aimed at enhance
security of supply in electricity systems. Can be framed as call options on
power production sold by power producers to the System Operators. This
chapter provides a comprehensive mathematical treatment of the Reliability
Options. Their value is first derived by means of closed-form pricing for-
mulas, which are obtained under several assumptions about the dynamics of
the electricity prices and the strike prices. Then, the value of the Reliability
Option is simulated under a real-market calibration, using data of the Italian
Power market. Sensitivity analyses are performed to highlight the impact of
power and strike price level and volatility, mean reversion speeds and corre-
lation coefficient on the Reliability Options’ evaluation.
∗This paper is a joint work with Fulvio Fontini (Universita` degli Studi di Padova) and
Tiziano Vargiolu (Universita` degli Studi di Padova). This paper has been submitted to
an international journal.
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3.1 Introduction
In several electricity markets worldwide there are capacity remuneration
mechanisms that explicitly remunerate power capacity.1 Among these, Reli-
ability Options (RO) recognize the option nature of the investments in power
capacity (or in load reduction) and create a market for such an option. ROs,
firstly proposed in Va´zquez et al. (2002), have been implemented in Colombia
(Firm Energy Obligations (Cramton and Stoft (2007))), NE-ISO (Forward
Capacity Market (FERC (2014))) and in Ireland (SEM (2015, 2016b,a))) and
are about to be implemented in Italy (ARERA (2018); EC (2018); Mastropi-
etro et al. (2017)). They are real options, namely, tools to commercialize
through a financial product the possibility given by generation capacity (or
load reduction) of providing security of supply by producing electricity (or
reducing load). They give the holder, i.e., the System Operator (SO), which
acquires them in a competitive setting, the right to call the generation ca-
pacity (or load) to produce power (or to reduce the load), and receive the
positive difference between the electricity price that effectively occurs in the
market and a pre-defined price level. Such a level, which corresponds to the
strike price of the option, is set in order to represent the value of the power
at that specific level for which load is not shed, i.e., it is the highest system
marginal price compatible with load provision with no load shedding.
It is interesting to evaluate the RO as a financial asset. As any finance
textbook shows (see e.g. Benth et al. (2008); Bjork (1998)), there are two
ways to calculate the value of a financial product. The first one calls for
defining its demand and supply, and searching for the equilibrium price under
some market rules. The other one is the arbitrage approach, which asks for
calculating the value of a replicating portfolio that yields the same return of
the asset under all possible states of the world.
For the case of ROs, the equilibrium approach requires estimating their
demand and supply. The demand of ROs is expressed by the SO. Even though
the details of the RO demands depend on the specific rules in place in the
different RO schemes, the procedure followed to derive such a demand is quite
general and requires first to identify the targeted Security of Supply (SoS),
then translate it into a desired level of installed capacity and finally introduce
1See Rodilla and Batlle (2013) and Cramton et al. (2013) for an introduction to capacity
remuneration mechanisms
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some security interval around that level and the corresponding premium and
discount price that the SO is willing to pay to obtain it. The supply of
RO is provided by eligible investors (that in some RO schemes might be
further distinguished between existing capacity owners and future investors,
depending on the different market rules), who participate in the RO market
by first estimating their expected cost of investments and then strategically
betting in the RO market. The arbitrage approach, on the contrary, requires
identifying the stochastic property of the asset under evaluation as well as
assuming that a continuous arbitrage between the financial derivative and
the underlying asset is possible.
In a first-best world, with complete and perfectly competitive markets,
both approaches lead to the same evaluation. However, in a second-best
world, they rely on different assumptions. For instance, in the case of the
RO, the evaluation following the equilibrium approach depends crucially on
the estimation of the level of capacity needed to provide SoS and the TSO’s
willingness to pay for it, and on the strategic behavior of participants to the
market mechanism allocating the RO. Such an estimate can turn out to be
a difficult exercise. In fact, it is true that the amount of capacity that yields
the targeted level of security of supply could be set administratively, or could
be detected applying some simulation techniques; however, this does not
guarantee that the demand is set at the efficient level, or that the estimate
is correct, given the difficulties of measuring the willingness to pay for it.
The same can be said about the strategic behavior of capacity providers,
which might be influenced by several variables, including the auction market
rules adopted to allocate ROs. The arbitrage approach, on the contrary,
depends crucially on the assumption about the probability distribution of
the underlying. In some cases, it can provide closed-form equations showing
how the value depends on the different parameters of the distribution function
of the underlying, in the style of the Black and Scholes formula (Benth et al.
(2008); Bjork (1998)) evaluating European call options.
The latter is the framework of this analysis. We follow the arbitrage ap-
proach and estimate the value of the ROs under different possible assump-
tions about the dynamics of the stochastic processes on which they depend.
RO are complex options on power supply that can have different lengths
and can be executed several times at different and possibly random strike
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prices. Therefore, in order to evaluate ROs, it is necessary to provide a
comprehensive mathematical treatment of all their aspects. This is the pur-
pose of this chapter, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study
undertaking this task. We first show semi-explicit formulae to evaluate the
ROs, starting from the simplest possible assumption about electricity prices
and the strike prices, and increasing the level of complexity of ROs, allowing
for an underlying that can be a mean reverting process, for stochastic strike
prices and for possibly negative electricity prices. We then simulate the RO
values under different possible assumptions, and calibrate the RO parame-
ters against real electricity market data, namely, the Italian Power Exchange
ones. The availability of long hourly price time series and the forthcoming
introduction of RO in the Italian market both justify the choice.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes ROs and presents
a pricing formula under realistic assumptions. Section 3.3 presents the pricing
approaches, depending on the model that we can consider both for electricity
prices as well as for the strike price of the RO. We start by defining the
arbitrage-free boundaries of RO’s evaluation. Then we move from the very
simplistic model of geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with deterministic
strike, to correlated GBMs for stochastic strike, and by increasing realism on
the model, we arrive to the case when both electricity and strike prices are
seasonal and mean-reverting. For all these models, we present semi-explicit
pricing formulas. Finally, we provide some insights for the case of negative
prices. In Section 3.4, we provide a simulation of the RO evaluation and
perform a sensitivity analysis, using data of the Italian Power market for
estimates and calibration. Section 3.5 concludes. Data of the estimates and
proofs of propositions are in the Appendix.
3.2 Reliability options
ROs are sold in an auction, typically every year, to deliver electricity with a
given lead time T1, for a pre-defined (T2−T1)-length period of delivery. The
rules of the RO specify that the capacity provider, who sells the option, must
commit to deliver the capacity to the buyer, which in general is the TSO.
Such a commitment is made effective by prescribing that the seller must offer
to the market an amount of electricity equal to the committed capacity and
return any positive difference between the reference market price and the
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strike price K.
Each RO contract scheme specifies what a market is. In a first approxima-
tion, the reference market can be a convex combination of different markets,
such as the day-ahead or the balancing or the real-time ones. Some RO
schemes, though, only have one reference market. For instance, in Ireland,
the reference market is the day-ahead one, while in NE-ISO it is the real-time
one.
Let P represent the day-ahead market price and P (b) the price in the bal-
ancing market (or in the real-time market). Then the reference market price
R can be approximated as
R = λP + (1− λ)P (b),
where λ ∈ [0, 1] may depend on the country: λ = 0 for ISO New England; λ =
1 for Colombia and Ireland; λ ∈ [0, 1] in the case of Italy (see Mastropietro
et al. (2017) for a description of the forthcoming Italian market).
The strike price is, in general, determined by taking into account the vari-
able costs of the reference peak technology, i.e. the dispatchable technology
that would be included in the optimal generation mix with the lowest uni-
tary investment cost. In actual RO markets, the strike price is communicated
to potential sellers of ROs before the auction takes place. Thus, it can be
treated as a deterministic parameter. However, it is also possible that the
strike price changes overtime during the life span of the RO. This is a pos-
sibility envisaged, for instance, in the forthcoming Italian RO scheme. In
such a scheme, the rule linking the strike price to a reference marginal tech-
nology is set before the auction, but the marginal cost of such a technology
is calculated every given period (a month) during the life span of the RO.2
This implies that the strike price can also be conceived as a stochastic pro-
cess. We shall first derive the RO value starting with the simplest case, and
then increase the level of complexity, to derive a general representation of
the value of the RO.
2See Mastropietro et al. (2017) and Terna (2017a,b,c).
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3.2.1 A simple mathematical model for Reliability Op-
tions
The mathematical modeling of the general RO is quite complex, as many
auctions and prices are involved. We simplify it by defining a mathematical
model for the case when the reference price is simply the day-ahead price P ,
i.e. λ = 1, as in the Colombian or in the Irish CRM schemes. In this way,
only one state variable is needed for the reference market price R, and it is
indeed P . We work on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0 ,Q) such
that the probability measure Q is the risk-neutral pricing measure used by
the market, and the day-ahead price P = (Pt)t≥0 is a Q-semimartingale. We
set t = 0 as the auction time concerning capacity in the time period [T1, T2].
Starting from these assumptions, we consider a simple case, namely that
of a thermal plant, with total capacity Q > 0. This plant converts a fuel
(oil, gas or coal) into electricity, whose spot price is P . Let C = (Ct)t≥0
represent the costs associated to the power plant, i.e. fuel costs, emission
costs, operational costs and others. The power plant sells the electricity at
time t ≥ 0 when it wins the day-ahead auction, i.e. when its bid bt is less
than or equal to Pt.
We adopt the usual simplifications, as continuous time instead of hourly
granularity and no ramping penalties/constraints. The plant can decide its
bid process b = (bt)t≥0 to maximize its revenues. Therefore the value of the
power plant at t = 0, concerning the time period [T1, T2], depends on its
income over that time interval. This depends on the solution of the problem
V (T1, T2) = sup
b∈B
EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ1bt≤Pt(Pt − Ct)dt
∣∣∣∣F0] ,
with B being the set of adapted processes on [T1, T2], r the instantaneous
risk-free rate of return, and EQ the expectation with respect to Q.
Obviously it will be optimal to have 1bt≤Pt = 1 if and only if Pt > Ct, i.e.
the optimal bidding process is bt = Ct, for all t ∈ [T1, T2] and the final payoff
for a thermal plant is
V (T1, T2) = E
Q
[
Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rt(Pt − Ct)+dt
∣∣∣∣F0] .
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On the other hand, when the thermal plant writes a RO with strike price
K = (Kt)t≥0, it must again place a bid, the bidding price bt remains at its
choice, and the plant must always pay back (Pt−Kt)+. Therefore the payoff,
in this case, takes the value:
Vro(T1, T2) = sup
b∈B
EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ(1bt≤Pt(Pt − Ct)− (Pt −Kt)+) dt
∣∣∣∣F0]
and bt = Ct for all t ∈ [T1, T2] is again the optimal bidding strategy. Thus,
Vro(T1, T2) = V (T1, T2)− EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ(Pt −Kt)+ dt
∣∣∣∣F0] .
In a risk-neutral world, the value RO(T1, T2) of a RO written on the time
interval [T1, T2] should make the investor indifferent between having the orig-
inal plant without the RO, and having it with the RO written on it plus the
price of the option, i.e. V (T1, T2) = Vro(T1, T2) + RO(T1, T2). Therefore, the
final result is
RO(T1, T2) = V (T1, T2)− Vro(T1, T2)
= EQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtQ(Pt −Kt)+ dt
∣∣∣∣F0] (3.2.1)
Thus, the value of a reliability option issued by a thermal plant is equiva-
lent to the price of an insurance contract against price peaks. Interestingly
enough, notice that the operating strategy of the power plants does not
change. In electricity markets, it is well known that perfectly competitive
markets without CRMs, the so called energy only markets, provide enough
incentives to investment, and the same is true for optimally designed CRMs,
since the latter simply anticipate ex ante the supermarginal profits that in-
vestors would gain in energy only markets. In other words, the amount of
remuneration of capacity accruing from perfectly competitive markets for
CRMs equals the expected discounted value of the supermarginal profits
gained in electricity markets; in a world without market failures, the two
levels coincide. This is confirmed in this framework: without market power,
the value of operating the plant is independent on the form of remuneration
of power production, i.e., on whether the revenues accrue ex-ante from the
CRM or ex-post from selling electricity in the market.
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3.3 Pricing of Reliability Options
3.3.1 Model-free no-arbitrage bounds
Equation (3.2.1) already allows to produce model-free no-arbitrage bounds
on the price of the RO. In fact, starting from the put-call parity
(Pt −Kt)+ = (Kt − Pt)+ + Pt −Kt
we have that, since obviously 0 ≤ (Kt − Pt)+ ≤ Kt,
Pt −Kt ≤ (Pt −Kt)+ ≤ Pt
By multiplying the inequalities for e−rt, integrating and taking the expecta-
tion, we get
QEQ
[∫ T2
T1
e−rt(Pt −Kt) dt
∣∣∣∣F0] ≤ RO(T1, T2) ≤ QEQ [∫ T2
T1
e−rtPt dt
∣∣∣∣F0] .
The right-hand side represents the forward price of delivering the quantity
Q of electricity over the period [T1, T2]
3. By introducing the quantity
FP (0;T1, T2) := E
Q
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtPt dt
∣∣∣∣F0]
for this (unitary) forward price, in the case when Kt ≡ K, i.e., with fixed
strike, and recalling that we must have RO(T1, T2) ≥ 0, after a simple inte-
gration we can rewrite the no-arbitrage relation above as
Q
(
FP (0;T1, T2)−Ke
−rT1 − e−rT2
r
)+
≤ RO(T1, T2) ≤ QFP (0;T1, T2) ,
(3.3.1)
i.e. the value of a reliability option written on a total capacity Q for the pe-
riod [T1, T2] lies between the intrinsic value of Q call options on the forward
FP (0;T1, T2) with a modified strikeK
e−rT1−e−rT2
r
, andQ forwards FP (0;T1, T2).
Conversely, when K follows itself a stochastic process, by introducing an
3this is alternatively referred to as flow forward or swap, see e.g. Benth et al. (2008)
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analogous quantity
FK(0;T1, T2) := E
Q
[∫ T2
T1
e−rtKt dt
∣∣∣∣F0] ,
we have
Q (FP (0;T1, T2)− FK(0;T1, T2))+ ≤ RO(T1, T2) ≤ QFP (0;T1, T2) . (3.3.2)
Thus, the upper bound is the same, while the lower bound is now the intrinsic
value of Q exchange options on the forward FP (0;T1, T2) for the forward
FK(0;T1, T2).
The advantage of these no-arbitrage bounds lies in the fact that, though
no forward contract for the total period [T1, T2] could possibly be traded
on the markets, usually this period is a multiple of calendar years, whose
contracts are traded. For example, in the Italian RO design, the period
[T1, T2] typically starts on January, 1 of year Y and lasts until December, 31
of year Y + 2: thus, FP (0;T1, T2) ends up being just the sum of the three
calendar products for the years Y , Y + 1 and Y + 2. In the case when the
stochastic strikeK is indexed with some marginal technology fixed in advance
(e.g. combined cycle gas turbines), analogous forward contracts possibly exist
for the corresponding fuel (gas in this case).
The no-arbitrage bounds above are model-free, in the sense that they
should hold for any no-arbitrage model that we specify for the dynamics
of P , and possibly of K. However, in order to evaluate the RO as a financial
contract, it is necessary to specify the stochastic process modeling electric-
ity prices. The electricity price shows peculiarities that make it difficult to
model, as strong seasonality and mean-reversion. For this reason, several
processes have been adopted to reproduce the price dynamics. In the rest
of this section, we provide semi-explicit formulae to price ROs over the time
period [T1, T2] under different price dynamics, starting from the simplest one,
namely a GBM.
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3.3.2 Electricity spot price as a geometric Brownian
motion
Let us start with the simplest assumption, i.e. that the price of electricity
P evolves as a GBM, and the option’s strike price K is a fixed deterministic
value. We stress that the former is an assumption that we already know is
unreasonable, in the sense that it cannot be assumed to provide a realistic
representation of the dynamics of electricity prices. However, it is the sim-
plest possible assumption that is used to derive explicit pricing formulas for
call options. Thus, we treat it as a first simplified approach that helps us
presenting the main features of the model. In this case, the price P , under
the risk-neutral measure Q, is assumed to be the solution of the following
SDE:
dPt =rPtdt+ σPtdBt, (3.3.3)
where B is a one-dimensional Q-Brownian motion and r is the instantaneous
risk-free rate of return.
The price of a RO in this case is equivalent to the time integral over the
interval [T1, T2] of a European call option with strike price K and maturity
ranging in [T1, T2].
In the following proposition we provide a semi-explicit formula to price the
RO, under the assumptions above.
Proposition 3.3.1. Let the reference market price P follow the dynam-
ics (3.3.3), then the price of a reliability option over the time interval [T1, T2]
with fixed strike price K ≥ 0 is given by the following formula:
RO(T1, T2) =
∫ T2
T1
Q
[
P0N(d1(K,P0, t))− e−rtKN(d2(K,P0, t))
]
dt ,
(3.3.4)
where N is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian ran-
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dom variable and
d1(K,P0, t) =
1
σ
√
t
[
ln
(
P0
K
)
+
(
r +
σ2
2
)
t
]
,
d2(K,P0, t) =d1(K,P0, t)− σ
√
t .
Proposition 3.3.1 simply makes use of the Black and Scholes formula, since
the RO(T1, T2) value turns out to be the time integral of a family of call
options with the same underlying and strike price, indexed by their maturity
in [T1, T2].
4 Thus, it provides a formula that can be applied to calculate the
value of the RO, once that the parameters upon which the call depends on
have been set, namely, the riskless interest rate, the starting price P0 and the
volatility of the electricity price.
3.3.3 Electricity price and strike price as correlated
Geometric Brownian Motions
A first step towards increasing the level of complexity refers to modeling the
strike price as a stochastic process. Recall that, in ROs, the strike price
is the marginal cost of the marginal technology. Complex RO schemes can
allow it to change over time, according to a predefined rule. For instance, it
can be assumed that the strike price is given by the fuel cost of a predefined
marginal technology, such as Combined Cycle Gas Turbines, thus linked to
a reference fuel price. Alternatively, it can be established that the reference
price changes at fixed regular dates according to a given indexing formula,
for example monthly, and stays constant in each of these sub periods.5 In
any case, this requires to treat the strike price as a stochastic process. Thus,
a first extension of the model defined in Section 3.3.2 is modeling K and P
as two (possibly correlated) geometric Brownian motions. This means that
the prices (Kt, Pt)t≥0 follow a risk-neutral dynamics of the following type:{
dKt = (r − qk)Ktdt+ σkKtdB1t
dPt = (r − qp)Ptdt+ σpPtdB2t ,
(3.3.5)
4Interestingly enough, this result solves also a problem firstly posed in McDonald and
Siegel (1985), in the framework of firms’ evaluations.
5As mentioned, this is going to be the case of the future Italian RO scheme.
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where (B1, B2) are correlated Q-Brownian motions, with correlation ρ ∈
[−1, 1]. Notice that the correlation of the two stochastic processes depends
on their nature and on the rules defining the strike price. For instance, if the
variable strike price is set to be equal to the marginal cost of the marginal
technology, and if the electricity market is perfectly competitive, it would
be natural to assume a correlation coefficient equal to 1, being the system
marginal price equal to the marginal cost of the marginal technology. If,
on the contrary, the stochastic strike price equals some weighted average
of different marginal costs at different hours, for instance at peak and off-
peak hours, then the correlation coefficient would be positive but less than
1, since the electricity price P would be more volatile than the strike price
K. Finally, it is also possible that the strike price is negatively correlated
with the electricity price, depending on what the formula of the strike price
is and on what reference basket it is linked to. However, this possibility is
rather unlikely, for the reasons expressed above.
The following proposition provides the value of the RO with two GBMs:
Proposition 3.3.2. Let the reference market price P and the RO strike price
K follow the dynamics (3.3.5). Then the price of a reliability option over the
time interval [T1, T2] is given by
RO(T1, T2) =
∫ T2
T1
(
P0e
−qptN(a1(K0, P0, t))−K0e−qktN(a2(K0, P0, t))
)
dt ,
(3.3.6)
where N is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random
variable, and
a1(K0, P0, t) =
ln
(
P0
K0
)
+ (qp − qk)t
σ
√
t
+
1
2
σ
√
t ,
a2(K0, P0, t) =a1(K0, P0, t)− σ
√
t ,
σ =
√
σ2k + σ
2
p − 2ρσkσp =
√
(σk − σp)2 + 2(1− ρ)σkσp .
Proposition 3.3.2 is similar to Proposition 3.3.1, except for the fact that
here the Margrabe formula with dividends is used (see, for instance, Car-
mona and Durrleman (2003)), instead of the Black-Scholes one. In fact, here
RO(T1, T2) turns out to be the time integral of a family of options to ex-
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change the (random) electricity price P with the (random) strike price K,
again indexed by their maturity. As usual in the Margrabe formula, the rel-
evant volatility here is σ, which can be interpreted as the volatility of the
ratio P/K (i.e., the electricity price expressed in units of the strike price),
which is decreasing with respect to the correlation ρ. In particular, for ρ→ 1
(i.e. when the strike price is much correlated with the electricity price), we
have σ → |σk − σp|. In this case, when σk = σp, the volatility vanishes, and
the value of the option is given just by its intrinsic value. Instead, for ρ→ −1
(i.e. when the strike price is much negatively correlated with the electricity
price), we have σ → σk + σp, i.e., the volatility is maximized. However, we
stress that this latter case is rather unlikely for the case of RO, as typically a
stochastic strike price K is defined in terms of quantities related to electricity
generation (as e.g. the marginal price of the marginal technology, or some
related market index), so that we should expect a positive correlation.
3.3.4 Mean-reverting electricity price with seasonality
As mentioned, the GBM dynamics for electricity prices used in the previous
sections is too simple and does not capture typical stylized facts of electricity
prices, namely seasonality and mean-reversion. A natural extension concerns
the pricing of ROs when the dynamics of the reference price shows the afore-
mentioned stylized facts. In particular, we choose to model the log-spot price
of electricity with a mean-reverting dynamics that encodes different season-
alities by means of a time-dependent function. Seasonality can be modeled in
different ways, for example using dummy variables , or a linear combination
of trigonometric functions (see for instance Benth et al. (2008) and references
therein). Here we chose to model seasonality using different dummies, as in
Eq. (4.3.2). For simplicity, we start by assuming that the strike price is
deterministic. In the next section, we shall remove this assumption.
We define the function describing seasonality trends for all t ≥ 0, as
µ(t) =
11∑
i=1
βimonthi +
3∑
i=1
δi dayi +
23∑
i=1
γi houri + α , (3.3.7)
where monthi, dayi and houri are dummies for month, day of week and hour,
used to capture different types of seasonality. Specifically, we assume that
day can take 4 values: ‘Friday’, ‘Weekend’, ‘Monday’, and ‘other working
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day’. This captures the differences between working days and weekend as
well as possible first- or end-of-the-working-week effect.
Then we consider the day-ahead price P as
Pt = e
µ(t)eXt , (3.3.8)
where Xt, under the risk-neutral measure Q, is the solution of the SDE
dXt =− λXtdt+ σdWt , (3.3.9)
where W is a one dimensional Q-Brownian motion, σ stands for the volatility
and λ > 0 is the mean-reversion speed. We have the following:
Proposition 3.3.3. Let the reference market price P follow the dynam-
ics (3.3.8)–(3.3.9). Then the price of a reliability option over the time interval
[T1, T2] with fixed strike price K ≥ 0 is given by
RO(T1, T2) =Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rt
[
eµ(t)+mt+
V ar(t)
2 N(d2(K,P0, t))−KN(d1(K,P0, t))
]
dt ,
(3.3.10)
where N is the CDF of a normal random variable, P0 = e
µ(0)+X0 and
mt =X0e
−λt ,
V ar(t) =
σ2
2λ
(1− e−2λt) ,
d1(K,P0, t) =
1√
V ar(t)
(µ(t) +mt − lnK) ,
d2(K,P0, s) =d1(K,P0, t) +
√
V ar(t) .
Remark 3.3.1. Equation (3.3.10) is a generalization of Equation (3.3.4): in
fact, if we let µ(t) := (r− qp− 12σ2)t and λ→ 0, then, at the limit, we obtain
again the model of the previous section. In fact, we have that mt ≡ X0,
V ar(t)→ σ2t,
e−rteµ(t)+mt+
V ar(t)
2 → e(r−qp)t+X0 ,
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and
d1(K,P0, t)→ 1
σ
√
t
(
X0 + (r − qp)t− 1
2
σ2t− lnK
)
=
1
σ
√
t
ln
eX0+(r−qp)t
K
− 1
2
σ
√
t .
Thus, the evaluation formula in Equation (3.3.10) collapses into that of
Equation (3.3.4).
3.3.5 Allowing for mean-reverting strike price with sea-
sonality
As already pointed out at the end of Section 3.2, a stochastic K is used to
model its possible dependence on variables linked to electricity generation.
Thus, a natural extension of the model in Section 3.3.4 consists in providing
also K with a mean-reverting dynamics including a seasonality term. The
dynamics of the state variables become then
{
Pt = e
µ(t)eXt ,
Kt = e
ν(t)eYt .
(3.3.11)
Here µ is given by (4.3.2) and ν is a seasonality function for K of the same
form, while the processes X and Y are solution to the following:{
dXt = −λxXtdt+ σxdW 1t ,
dYt = −λyYtdt+ σydW 2t ,
(3.3.12)
where (W 1,W 2) are correlated Q-Brownian motions, with correlation ρ ∈
[−1, 1]. One can prove that the price of the reliability option is given by the
following expression:
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rtEQ
[
(eµ(t)eXt − eν(t)eYt)+ ∣∣F0] dt. (3.3.13)
It is easy to see that the above formula is the time integral of a family of
exchange options, indexed by their expiration date in [T1, T2].
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Proposition 3.3.4. Let the reference market price P and the RO strike price
K follow the dynamics (3.3.11); then the price of a reliability option over the
time interval [T1, T2] is given by
RO(T1, T2) =Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rt
[
EQ[Pt]N (d2(K0, P0, t))− EQ[Kt]N (d1(K0, P0, t))
]
dt
(3.3.14)
where N is the CDF of a normal random variable, P0 = e
µ(0)+X0, K0 =
eν(0)+Y0 and
EQ[Pt] = e
µ(t)+e−λxtX0+ 12σ
2
x
1−e−2λxt
2λx , (3.3.15)
EQ[Kt] = e
ν(t)+e−λytY0+ 12σ
2
y
1−e−2λyt
2λy , (3.3.16)
d1(K0, P0, t) :=
1√
V ar(t)
(µ(t)− ν(t) + m¯t) , (3.3.17)
d2(K0, P0, t) := d1(K0, P0, t) +
√
V ar(t) , (3.3.18)
m¯t := e
−λxtX0 − e−λytY0 + ρσxσy 1− e
−(λx+λy)t
λx + λy
− σ2y
1− e−2λyt
2λy
,
(3.3.19)
V ar(t) := σ2x
1− e−2λxt
2λx
+ σ2y
1− e−2λyt
2λy
− 2ρσxσy 1− e
−(λx+λy)t
λx + λy
.
(3.3.20)
This result is a similar to Proposition 3.3.3 in the same sense as Proposition
3.3.2 is similar to Proposition 3.3.1: in fact, here RO(T1, T2) turns out to be
again the time integral of a family of options to exchange the electricity price
P with the strike price K. Here too, the relevant volatility is V ar(t), which
can again be interpreted as the volatility of the ratio P/K (i.e., the electricity
price expressed in units of the strike price: this is made explicit in the proof
in Appendix 3.6), which is again decreasing with respect to the correlation
ρ. In particular, for ρ→ 1 (i.e. when the strike price is much correlated with
the electricity price), and λx = λy =: λ (i.e. when the two mean-reversion
speeds are the same), we have V ar(t) → 1−e−2λt
2λ
(σx − σy)2. In this case,
when σx = σy, the volatility vanishes, and the value of the option is given
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just by its intrinsic value. Instead, in the unlikely case (see the discussion at
the end of Section 3.3.3) when ρ → −1 (i.e. when the strike price is much
negatively correlated with the electricity price) and λx = λy =: λ, we have
V ar(t)→ 1−e−2λt
2λ
(σx + σy)
2, i.e., the volatility is maximized.
3.3.6 Possible extension to negative day-ahead and strike
prices
In principle, it is possible to allow for power prices to have negative values,
since we know this is a possibility in energy prices, see Edoli et al. (2017) and
references therein. An analogous extension can be also imagined for strike
prices, especially when these are linked to power prices.
A possible approach to model negative prices is to set negative values −P ∗
and −K∗, for certain P ∗, K∗ ≥ 0, as price floors for P and K, respectively,
and to consider for them a shifted dynamics of the type{
Pt =
(
eµ(t)eXt − P ∗) ,
Kt =
(
eν(t)eYt −K∗) . (3.3.21)
where µ and ν are again seasonality functions for P and K and the processes
X and Y are solutions of Equation (3.3.12), in analogy with the previous
section.
By setting C := P ∗ − K∗, one can prove that the price of the reliability
option is now given by the following expression:
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
e−rtEQ
[
(eµ(t)eXt − eν(t)eYt − C)+ ∣∣F0] dt. (3.3.22)
It is easy to see that the above formula is the time integral of a family of
spread options with a fixed strike price C and indexed by their expiration
date in [T1, T2]. Therefore, considering dynamics of type (3.3.21) relates the
problem of pricing a Reliability Option to the problem of pricing a spread op-
tion (see Carmona and Durrleman (2003) for a survey of classical frameworks
and methods for spread options). Unfortunately, a general closed formula for
the pricing of spread options is not available. However, since the RO is in
principle a product which is quite illiquid, one can use a numerical method
to price it in this general case, for example Monte Carlo.
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3.4 Simulation and sensitivity analysis
In this section we simulate the value of the RO under realistic assumptions
on the value of the parameters. To do so, we fit the parameters of the elec-
tricity price dynamics to a real market, using data of the Italian market. For
simplicity, we consider day-ahead prices only, and use the weighted average
of Italian zonal prices, called PUN (Prezzo Unico Nazionale), ranging from
January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016.
As previously explained, we use dummies to capture monthly, daily and
hourly seasonality, as defined in Eq. (4.3.2). We choose ‘January’, ‘Fri-
day’ and ‘hour 1’ as reference groups, against which the comparisons are
made. Figure 3.1 shows the calibrated seasonality function, plotted against
the historical PUN data. Furthermore, we consider an annual risk-free rate
r = 0.01, and, in the pricing models where the only stochastic variable is the
electricity price, we consider K = 40 AC /MWh. The pricing of the RO starts
4 years from now, and the option has a maturity of 3 years (T1 = 4, T2 = 7).
This resembles the structure of the RO which is about to be implemented in
the Italian market. The starting point X0 is taken equal to 0.
Table 3.1 reports the estimated parameters for each different model, while
Table B.1 shows the estimated seasonality parameters.
GBM 1-OU 2-OU
σˆ 5.4041 6.5932 6.5932
λˆ - 294.84 294.84
Table 3.1: Estimated yearly parameters σˆ and λˆ for each pricing model (electricity
price following a Geometric Brownian motion (GBM), electricity price following a
mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (1-OU), correlated electricity and strike
prices following mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (2-OU)).
As mentioned, real electricity prices do not follow GBMs. Therefore, in
the simulation, we start from the model defined in Section 3.3.4.
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Figure 3.1: Seasonality function in (4.3.2) (solid red line, upper panel) calibrated
on historical 2016 PUN electricity data (solid blue line, upper panel) and residuals
(bottom panel).
3.4.1 Mean reverting electricity price with seasonality,
fixed strike
We simulate the value of the RO using the Monte Carlo methodology. Specif-
ically, we compute the RO value using 10,000 simulations of the price path
of the underlying.
Figure 3.3 shows the comparative statics for different parameters σ and
λ and strike price K. As expected, the higher the strike price, the lower
the value of the reliability option for each value of σ (left panel). On the
other hand, both the left and right panel show that, when σ increases, the
RO value rises as well. Moreover, when λ is low, the relative increase in the
RO value is high (right panel). This is consistent with the fact that a low λ
allows fluctuations of the underlying that are far from the long term mean
to be more persistent.
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Figure 3.3: Sensitivity analysis of the results using a yearly σ in the range (0; 2σˆ]
with a strike price K in the range [20; 60] (left panel), and a yearly σ in the range
(0; 2σˆ] with and a yearly λ in the range (100; 2λˆ] (right panel). The RO value is
expressed in AC /MWh.
3.4.2 Electricity spot price and RO strike price as cor-
related OU with seasonality
We simulate now the value of the RO using the model described in Section
3.3.5, again by means of a Monte Carlo method (again using 10,000 runs).
We start from a given correlation coefficient, set at ρ = 0.5, and assume that
λK and σK are equal to the ones estimated for the electricity price. Again,
X0 = 0. In line with the PUN mean price, which is equal to 42.77 AC /MWh,
K0 is arbitrarily chosen equal to 40 AC /MWh, so that, after de-seasonilizing
(using the same estimated seasonality parameters of the PUN price), we
obtain Y0 = −0.21.
Figure 3.4 shows the results when we assume the strike price process to have
the same parameters estimated for the electricity price P . The upper left
panel shows that the initial level of the strike price K0 has no influence on the
value of the reliability option. This is due to the magnitude of the estimated
λP , and thus of λK : a mean reversion speed as high as that estimated makes
the strike price process return to its mean level in an amount of time negligible
with respect to the maturity, meaning that the starting point of the process
has no relevant impact on the RO value.
The upper right panel of Figure 3.4 instead shows how sensitive the RO
value is to changes in the electricity price parameters λP and σP (and thus in
turn in λK and σK). Similarly to what we have observed before, the higher
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Figure 3.4: Sensitivity analysis of the results using a yearly σP in the range (0; 2σˆP ]
with an initial strike K0 in the range [20; 100] (upper left panel), with a yearly λP in
the range (100; 2λˆP ](upper right panel), with a correlation ρ in the range [−1; 1] (left
bottom panel) and with a yearly risk free rate r in the range [0; 0.2] (right bottom
panel).
the volatility of the underlying (and, in this case, of the strike price), the
higher the RO value, and this relationship increases in proportionality as the
speed of mean reversion lowers, since it takes more time to return to the
mean, and thus volatility matters more.
The impact of the correlation factor ρ is instead investigated in the bot-
tom left panel, where we assessed how different correlation factors in the
range [1;−1] affect the price of the reliability option. When the two assets
are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1), the RO value is zero for all levels of σP .
In fact, as we have seen in Section 3.2, the volatility is minimized and the
RO can be interpreted as an integral of calls, with maturity ranging in the
interval [T1, T2], being exactly at the money at the time of expiration, and
thus having zero value. Instead, as shown, when the two processes are un-
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correlated, the level of risk increases, and it reaches its maximum when they
are perfectly negatively correlated. In this case, the volatilities of the two
Brownian motions sum up, increasing the overall volatility of the option pay-
off and minimizing the risk of having the call options at the money. Finally,
the bottom right panel shows that the RO price is negatively correlated with
the risk free rate r: a higher r decreases the option value as it lowers the
discounted cash flows.
In the previous figures, the parameters for λP and λK , and σP and σK , were
tied together, in the sense that λK and σK were always equal to, respectively,
λP and σP .
Instead, we now investigate what happens keeping σK equal to σP as before,
but changing λK independently from λP . Moreover, we also investigate the
effects of a variation in σP different from that in σK . Figure 3.5 and 3.6 show
the results.
The left panel of Figure 3.5 reports the results for a variation in λK (in
the range (0; 2λˆP ] and shown in log10 scale) independent from the value of
λP . We can see how K0 hardly affects the reliability option value, having an
impact only when both σK and λK are sufficiently small. This confirms the
result shown above, i.e. that the initial condition of the parameters matters
only when it takes a sufficient amount of time for them (for the strike price,
in this case) to return to their long term value. The right panel instead
shows the sensitivity of the RO value to changes in the yearly λK (again in
the range (0; λˆP ]) independent from the value of λP , and in the correlation
factor ρ (in the range [−1; 1]) (in this graph, σK is always equal to σP and
they are in turn equal to σˆP , λP = λˆP , and λK is shown in log10 scale.). Here
we can see that the ρ value matters more when both λK = λP and σK = σP .
In fact, ρ affects (negatively) the RO value only when it tends to −1 and λK
is closer to the value of λP (note that, in the figure, λK ∈ (0; λˆP ], where λˆP
corresponds to the value of 2.47 in log10 scale). This confirms the intuition
that when the initial value of the electricity price and the strike price are
close, and the two random variables follow the same dynamics, the RO has
a limited or null value since it is likely that it will be always at the money.
Conversely, if the two random variables are not perfectly correlated, or they
follow different dynamics, it is unlikely that at every point in time Pt and Kt
coincide, and this adds value to the RO.
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Figure 3.5: Sensitivity analysis of the results using a yearly λK in the range (0; λˆP ]
with an initial strike price K0 in the range [20; 100], both with a yearly σK equal to
the yearly σP (upper left panel) and with and a scaled down yearly σK (upper right
panel), and with a correlation ρ in the range [−1; 1] (bottom panel) (here σK = σP ).
The RO value is expressed in AC /MWh.
Finally, Figure 3.6 shows the effect of a disjoint variation in the two volatil-
ities, with a yearly σP and σK in the range (0; 2σˆP ], for different levels of
ρ (in these graphs, λK is always equal to λP = λˆP ). When ρ ≤ 0, we can
see that the RO price is always increasing in the electricity price volatility
σP and in the strike price’s one σK . This is as expected, since the volatil-
ity adds value to the call options. Instead, when ρ > 0, the fact that the
two processes move together can lower the aggregate risk, since the spread
between the electricity price and the strike price decreases. This translates
into a negative effect on the option value. The RO value is minimized when
σP = σK . In Figure 3.6, panel ρ = 0.5, we can see that the option value is
still positive; in the panel ρ = 1, the RO value becomes null for σP = σK ,
since, as we have seen, having two perfectly positively correlated identical
processes means that the RO value simply corresponds to its intrinsic value.
Thus, there is a non-monotone effect of the rise of volatility of one process,
depending on the amount of volatility of the other process, and on the level
of the correlation coefficient. The flex is maximum when the two processes
are perfectly positively correlated.
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3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have studied the value of the RO from a financial per-
spective. The simplified mathematical model that we proposed is a starting
point in the analysis of ROs. In particular, it does not consider the different
market mechanisms through which they are sold, or the possible strategic
behavior of power producers. However, even in this simplified framework,
we obtained semi-explicit formulae for the value of the RO, increasing the
level of realism and complexity of the model. We moved from simple inte-
grals of call options written on GBMs to correlated mean reverting processes
that capture the behavior of realistic electricity price time series, on the one
hand, and complex rules for RO, on the other hand. Then, we simulated
the value of the Reliability Option through a real-market calibration of the
parameters. We saw that the value of the RO moves coherently with expec-
tations of option theory: a rise in strike price lowers the RO value, which
depends positively on the volatility of the electricity price, as well as on the
volatility of the strike price itself. The mean reversion speed of the processes
reduces the impact of the starting point, which was another expected result.
However, when both the strike price and the electricity price are assumed to
be stochastic processes, the value of the RO crucially depends on their cor-
relation coefficient ρ. In particular, a positive correlation reduces the value
of the RO. Moreover, there is a non-monotone impact of the volatility of
one process, depending on the level of volatility of the other process and
on a positive correlation. This is important when designing the rule of the
RO. For instance, if the strike price is allowed to change with respect to a
reference marginal cost, which is also believed to be the technology setting
the system marginal price at the day ahead level, the two process clearly
covariate positively. In this case, it is very likely that a RO scheme has a
very limited value, for every possible starting value of the state variables P
and K.
More in general, our results show that a careful estimate of the parameters
is needed to calculate the value of the ROs. Ceteris paribus, the RO value will
be lower the lower the volatility of the electricity price, the higher the strike
price, the quicker the speed of mean reversion, the higher the correlation of
the electricity price with the strike price, if the latter is allowed to change
over time, and the closer the two volatilities to each other. These are all
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factors that need to be taken into account when designing the market for
ROs and calculating the equilibrium value.
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3.6 Appendix B
B.1 Seasonality parameters’ estimates
Estimate S.E. pValue Estimate S.E. pValue
Intercept 3.79 0.01 0 hour6 −0.13 0.01 0
month2 −0.22 0.01 0 hour7 −0.01 0.01 0.5
month3 −0.27 0.01 0 hour8 0.1 0.01 0
month4 −0.36 0.01 0 hour9 0.18 0.01 0
month5 −0.28 0.01 0 hour10 0.16 0.01 0
month6 −0.23 0.01 0 hour11 0.12 0.01 0
month7 −0.07 0.01 0 hour12 0.07 0.01 0
month8 −0.21 0.01 0 hour13 0 0.01 0.8
month9 −0.07 0.01 0 hour14 −0.05 0.01 0
month10 0.14 0.01 0 hour15 −0.02 0.01 0.13
month11 0.23 0.01 0 hour16 0.04 0.01 0
month12 0.21 0.01 0 hour17 0.09 0.01 0
Monday −0.01 0.01 0.04 hour18 0.15 0.01 0
Weekend −0.14 0.01 0 hour19 0.22 0.01 0
Working day 0.02 0.01 0 hour20 0.28 0.01 0
hour2 −0.08 0.01 0 hour21 0.27 0.01 0
hour3 −0.15 0.01 0 hour22 0.2 0.01 0
hour4 −0.18 0.01 0 hour23 0.12 0.01 0
hour5 −0.18 0.01 0 hour24 0.03 0.01 0.01
Table B.1: Linear regression estimates, standard errors and p-values obtained using
the specification in (4.3.2). The base group categories for each dummy variable are
month1, Friday and hour1.
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B.2 Proofs of pricing formulae
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. Let us underline that we can write the following:
RO(T1, T2) =
∫
Ω
∫ T2
T1
f(s, ω)ds dQ(ω|F0),
where f(s, ω) : = e−rsQ(Ps(ω)−K)+ is a non-negative measurable function
from [T1, T2]× Ω to R. Then, if we set
A(K,P0, s) : = e
−rsEQ
[
(Ps −K)+
∣∣F0] , (B.1)
by Tonelli’s theorem, we have immediately that
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K,P0, s)ds. (B.2)
A(K,P0, s) is clearly the price of a European call option with strike price K
and maturity s, thus equation (3.3.4) is obtained simply with Black and Sc-
holes formula.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2. As in the proof of Proposition 3.3.1, if we write
A(K0, P0, s) : = e
−rsEQ
[
(Ps −Ks)+
∣∣F0] ; (B.3)
then, by Tonelli’s theorem, we have
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K0, P0, s)ds.
Here A(K,P0, s) is clearly the price of an exchange option between the elec-
tricity price P and the strike price K, with maturity s, thus Equation (3.3.6)
is obtained simply with the Margrabe formula with dividends (see Carmona
and Durrleman (2003)).
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3. As in the previous proofs, writing A(K,P0, s) : =
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e−rsEQ
[
(Ps −K)+
∣∣F0] and applying Tonelli’s theorem give
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K,P0, s)ds.
We plan to evaluate A(K,P0, s) by exploiting the fact that the factor X,
described by the dynamics (3.3.9), is a Gaussian process. Indeed, it is easy
to show that almost surely, for all t > 0, it holds
Xt = X0e
−λt +
∫ t
0
e−kλ(t−s)σdWs = mt +
√
V ar(t)Z
with Z ∼ N(0, 1) and
EQ [Xt| F0] =X0e−λt =: mt,
VarQ [Xt| F0] =σ2 1− e
−2λt
2λ
=: V ar(t).
Thus we have that
Q{Ps > K} = Q{eµ(s)+Xs > K} = Q{Z < d1(K,P0, s)}
where Z ∼ N(0, 1) under Q. As above, we compute
EQ
[
(Ps −K)+
∣∣F0] = EQ [Ps 1{Z<d1(K,P0,s)}]−KQ{Z < d1(K,P0, s)} =
=
∫ d1(K,P0,s)
−∞
eµ(s)+ms+
√
V ar(s)x 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
x2 dx−KN(d1(K,P0, s)) =
= eµ(s)+ms+
1
2
V ar(s)
∫ d1(K,P0,s)
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
(x−
√
V ar(s))2 dx−KN(d1(K,P0, s)) =
= eµ(s)+ms+
1
2
V ar(s)
∫ d1(K,P0,s)+√V ar(s)
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
y2 dy −KN(d1(K,P0, s))
and Equation (3.3.10) follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. As before, we write
A(P0, K0, s) : = e
−rsEQ
[
(eµ(s)eXs − eν(s)eYs)+ ∣∣F0] ,
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we use by Tonelli’s theorem and we obtain
RO(T1, T2) = Q
∫ T2
T1
A(K,P0, K0, s)ds.
We start by noticing that, under the pricing measure Q, we have (Xs, Ys) ∼
N(M(s),Σ(s)), with
M(s) :=
(
e−λxsX0
e−λysY0
)
, Σ(s) :=
(
σ2x
1−e−2λxs
2λx
ρσxσy
1−e−(λx+λy)s
λx+λy
ρσxσy
1−e−(λx+λy)s
λx+λy
σ2y
1−e−2λys
2λy
)
From this, Equations (3.3.15) and (3.3.16) follow trivially. We now rewrite
A(P0, K0, s) as
A(K,P0, K0, s) = e
−rsEQ
[
Ks
(
Ps
Ks
− 1
)+ ∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
= e−rsEQK
[(
Ps
Ks
− 1
)+ ∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
EQ[Ks]
where we introduced the new probability measure QK , defined via its den-
sity as
dQK
dQ
:=
Ks
EQ[Ks]
=
eYs
EQ[eYs ]
.
With some algebra, one can verify that, under this new probability measure
QK , we have (Xs, Ys) ∼ N(M˜(s),Σ(s)), with
M˜(s) := M(s) +
(
ρσxσy
1−e−(λx+λy)s
λx+λy
σ2y
1−e−2λys
2λy
)
,
Thus, Xs − Ys ∼ N(m¯s, V ar(s)), with m¯s and V ar(s) given by Equations
(3.3.19) and (3.3.20), respectively. We then have that
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QK
{
Ps
Ks
> 1
}
= QK{eµ(s)−ν(s)+Xs−Ys > 1} = QK{Z < d1(K0, P0, s)} ,
where Z ∼ N(0, 1) under QK . Now, similarly to the proof of Proposition
3.3.3, we can now compute
EQ
[
(Ps −Ks)+
∣∣F0] = EQ[Ks]EQK [( Ps
Ks
− 1
)+ ∣∣∣∣∣F0
]
=
= EQ[Ks]
(
EQK
[
Ps
Ks
1{Z<d1(K0,P0,s)}
]
−QK{Z < d1(K0, P0, s)}
)
=
= EQ[Ks]
(∫ d1(K,P0,s)
−∞
eµ(s)−νs+m¯s+
√
V ar(s)x 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
x2 dx−N(d1(K,P0, s))
)
=
= EQ[Ks]
(
eµ(s)−νs+m¯s+
1
2
V ar(s)
∫ d1(K0,P0,s)
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
(x−
√
V ar(s))2 dx−
−N(d1(K0, P0, s))
)
=
= EQ[Ks]
(
eµ(s)−ν(s)+m¯s+
1
2
V ar(s)
∫ d1(K,P0,s)+√V ar(s)
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
y2 dy−
−N(d1(K,P0, s))
)
.
By using Equation (3.3.16) for EQ[Ks],
after some simplifications we arrive at the final result
EQ
[
(Ps −Ks)+
∣∣F0] =eµ(s)+e−λxsX0+ 12σ2x 1−e−2λxs2λx N (d1(K,P0, s) +√V ar(s))−
− eν(s)+e−λysY0+ 12σ2y 1−e
−2λys
2λy N(d1(K,P0, s))
and Equation (3.3.14) follows.
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Figure 3.6: Sensitivity analysis of the RO value to a disjoint variation in the two
volatilities, with a yearly σP and σK in the range (0; 2σˆP ] (here λK = λP ). In the
different panels, we can see how a variation in the correlation coefficient ρ affects the
RO value: when the two processes are independent or negatively correlated, higher
σP and σK result in a higher option value. However, when the correlation is positive
(middle right and bottom panels), the higher the correlation, and the more the two
volatilities are similar, the lower the value of the option. The RO value is expressed
in AC /MWh.
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Chapter 4
Optimal cross-border electricity
trading ∗
We show that electricity flows between interconnected locations have a direct
and indirect effect on electricity prices in the different locations. The direct
effect refers to how prices between two locations are affected when power is
flowing between these two locations only. The indirect effect refers to how the
flows between two locations affect the price of power in other locations that are
part of the interconnected electricity network. Based on this result we propose
a model of the joint dynamics of electricity prices where flows of electricity
affect, directly and indirectly, prices in all locations, and model a common co-
integration factor of prices. We solve the optimal control problem of an agent
who uses the interconnector to take positions in a subset of locations that are
part of the interconnected network. We reduce the Hamilton-Jacobi-Equation
satisfied by the value function of the investor to a system of Riccati equations,
which we solve analytically, and obtain the optimal electricity trading strat-
egy in closed-form. We show that including cross-border effects in the trading
strategy specification significantly improves the performance of the strategy,
that takes advantages of price differentials in interconnected locations. For
example, for contracts with delivery at 3 p.m., we show that over a time hori-
zon of one year, the optimal strategy delivers a profit that is approximately
∗This paper is a joint work with A´lvaro Cartea (University of Oxford), Tiziano Vargiolu
(Universita` degli Studi di Padova) and Georgi Slavov (Marex Spectron Ltd). This paper
was awarded the best paper general prize at the Commodity and Energy Markets 2018
Annual Meeting.
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4% more than the profit of a naive strategy, which is based on the spread
between locations (i.e., does not take into account cross-border effects).
4.1 Introduction
The recent market coupling initiatives in the European Union are aimed
at integrating the European wholesale electricity markets, thus increasing
security of supply while reducing price volatility across Europe. At the core of
the market coupling process, there is the construction of new interconnecting
facilities, namely bi-directional transmission lines connecting the grids of two
countries. The aim of this Chapter is to develop an optimal trading strategy
for an agent who uses the interconnectors to take simultaneous positions in
electricity contracts in all locations.
The first part is devoted to an econometric analysis of the electricity price
determinants, and the results of this analysis are employed in the second
part of the work, where we derive the optimal trading strategy by posing
and solving a stochastic control problem.
In our setup, we consider permanent and temporary impacts of cross-border
electricity flows on the electricity price, and we assume these impacts to be
linear in the agent’s speed of trading. The econometric analysis is instru-
mental in determining the magnitude of these impacts.
Our trading strategy makes then use of these market impacts, as well as
of the information provided by the co-movement of the electricity prices in
three interconnected countries object of our study. This is done by consid-
ering the joint dynamics of the three price processes, driven by intertwined
co-integration factors, and profiting from the structural dependence in the
electricity prices’ dynamics. We then pose an optimal control problem, and
solve the resulting dynamic programming equation, deriving a closed-form
solution up to a 10-ODEs system.
Our work builds on two streams of literature. The first one is related to
pairs trading. In this respect, one of the earliest contributions employing
co-integration in a stochastic control problem is that of Mudchanatongsuk
et al. (2008), who model the log-price spread of a pair of stocks as a mean-
reverting process, and use this in a stochastic control framework based on
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trading in the spread. Tourin and Yan (2013) employ a similar co-integration
model and find a closed-form solution for a dynamic trading strategy based
on a portfolio composed of a money bank account and two stocks. Extending
their work, Leung and Li (2015) and Lei and Xu (2015) formulate an optimal
entry-exit strategy on a pair of co-integrated assets. Benth et al. (2017)
develop a cross-commodity model with co-integrated dynamics in a Heath-
Jarrow-Morton framework. Finally, another extension to Tourin and Yan
(2013) is given by Cartea and Jaimungal (2016a) and Lintilhac and Tourin
(2017), who generalize their dynamic model for an arbitrary number of assets.
These last two works are those closest to ours, although our study differs in
the nature of assets traded, in the specification of the asset’s dynamics, and
in the definition of the co-integration factor.
Our model is also related to a second stream of literature, relative to the
modeling of power prices. Relevant works are those of Cartea and Figueroa
(2005), Roncoroni (2002), Geman and Roncoroni (2006), Benth et al. (2007)
and Weron (2007) (see also Benth et al. (2012) for a critical comparison of
the first four models).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents
the intra-day data collected for the analysis. In Section 4.3, using economet-
ric tools, we show the direct and indirect effects of the cross-border flows
of electricity on the electricity price in the countries object of our study;
moreover, we describe the stochastic process employed for modeling the elec-
tricity price, and estimate the relative parameters. Section 4.4 derives the
optimal trading strategy for an agent taking positions in electricity contracts
in all markets considered in the study. Section 4.5 showcases the empirical
performance of the strategy, while Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data
Electricity is a commodity that can be traded in different markets, and the
three main ones are the day-ahead market, the intra-day one and the forward
one. The main difference among these three markets is that, in each one of
them, one can trade contracts on electricity with a specific range of delivery
times.
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, the two spot markets, i.e. the day-
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ahead and the intra-day ones, also differ in their level of interconnectedness:
the day-ahead market is an integrated market, and prices are coupled, while
the intra-day market is not as integrated, and agents can decide to go and
buy electricity in another country, so that there are arbitrage opportunities.
The aim of this Chapter is to build on this opportunity and to develop an
optimal trading strategy for an agent who uses the interconnectors to take
simultaneous positions in electricity contracts in a set of locations in the
intra-day market.
One of the biggest exchanges where electricity can be traded is EPEX
Spot, the European power exchange for spot trading. Thus, we use tick data
relative to all hours and 15-minute period contracts traded on EPEX Spot
Intraday Continuous, for the period 01/01/2016 - 31/12/2017, corresponding
to 7,306,380 transactions (see Table 4.1 for a sample of the dataset).
Delivery Time Stamp
Market Area
Buy
Market Area
Sell
Volume
(MWh)
Price
(AC /MWh)
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:00:00 FR AT 12 35.70
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:02:00 FR AT 1 35.70
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:04:00 CH DE 1 39.00
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:04:00 CH AT 1 39.00
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:06:00 CH DE 1 38.80
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:08:00 DE DE 1 38.80
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:08:00 DE AT 19 39.00
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:14:00 DE CH 6 35.90
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:35:00 NL AT 20 38.90
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 10:35:00 NL DE 25 39.00
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 11:05:00 FR DE 5 37.10
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 11:05:00 DE DE 6 37.00
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 11:17:00 NL FR 1 38.00
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 11:48:00 DE DE 18 38.90
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 12:02:00 DE AT 11 38.30
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 12:02:00 DE AT 2 38.20
05/03/2017 h 21 2017-03-05 12:02:00 DE AT 10 38.10
Table 4.1: Sample of the dataset. Each row represents a different trade on the intra-
day spot market, and provides information about (from left to right) the hour and
day of delivery, about the time of execution of the transaction, about the originating
market area and the delivery market area, about the volume and the price of the
transaction.
In our model, we treated each country as if it was a distinct markets, so
that the agent can buy or sell electricity in all directions in any of these
markets.
The possibility of trading across the interconnected locations is limited by
the available transfer capacity (ATC) (Table 4.2), resulting from the subtrac-
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Figure 4.1: Physical flow of electricity (relative to contracts with delivery at 3 p.m.)
for each trading direction (starting from the top left panel: France to Switzerland,
Switzerland to France, France to Germany, Germany to France, Germany to Switzer-
land and Switzerland to Germany) over the corresponding ATC.
tion from nominal capacity (NTC) of the committed volume under long term
contracts, and after taking into account the transmission reliability margin.
The volumes in Table 4.1 are the so-called commercial flows; however, to
check the level of actual usage of the ATC, we need data about the so-called
physical flows, which are provided by ENTSO-E on their Transparency Plat-
form. In fact, the physical flows are the actual flows of electricity transiting
across the national borders into another country’s grid. As we can see in
Figure 4.1, the proportion of used ATC varies a lot throughout the year,
highlighting a seasonal pattern.
From To
Available Transfer
Capacity (MW)
France Switzerland 3,200
France Germany 3,000
Germany France 3,050
Germany Switzerland 800
Switzerland France 2,200
Switzerland Germany 4,000
Table 4.2: Available transfer capacity (ATC) for each trading direction.
The descriptive statistics relative to the volumes of electricity traded every-
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day in the intra-day market across the interconnected locations are reported
in Table 4.3. For exemplificatory purposes, we decided to report statistics
for contracts with delivery at 3 p.m. and 3 a.m., respectively a peak and
an off-peak hour. As we can see from the table, and as is also clear from
Figure 4.1, on average, the greatest load of electricity flows from France to
Switzerland, and there is a high volatility in volumes of electricity across all
the interconnected countries.
Mean Std. Dev. Max Min Skewness Kurtosis # of obs.
FR-CH
3 p.m. 16.10 9.72 100 0.1 0.52 6.66 5, 061
3 a.m. 14.18 10.08 50 0.1 0.33 2.64 1, 177
CH-FR
3 p.m. 14.55 9.88 100 0.1 0.59 4.98 3, 465
3 a.m. 14.15 11.05 101 0.1 1.28 9.4 1, 141
FR-DE
3 p.m. 10.84 9.69 148.4 0.1 1.76 15.24 6, 382
3 a.m. 10.17 9.43 100 0.1 1.78 11.91 5, 571
DE-FR
3 p.m. 11.91 10.98 342 0.1 6.03 144.13 7, 879
3 a.m. 10.81 10.25 300 0.1 5.32 122.03 5, 600
CH-DE
3 p.m. 9.79 8.32 50 0.1 0.79 2.74 4, 364
3 a.m. 8.74 8.49 98 0.1 1.52 8.25 3, 322
DE-CH
3 p.m. 10.69 8.71 100 0.1 0.99 5.32 5, 749
3 a.m. 8.26 8.01 76 0.1 1.34 5.66 3, 114
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of intra-day volumes between interconnected coun-
tries for contracts with delivery during a peak (3 p.m.) and an off-peak (3 a.m.) hour.
The values of mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum are expressed in
MWh.
Table 4.4 instead shows the descriptive statistics for intra-day prices (Panel
A) and price spreads (Panel B), for the same specific peak and off-peak hours.
Specifically, the statistics depicted in Panel A are found using all tick data
for each specific hour of delivery, while Panel B is built using a sub-sample of
the dataset: we divide the data in intervals of 60 minutes each, and consider
the “closing price” of each interval, that is the price of the last transaction
over those 60 minutes. In such a way, we can compare the prices of two
different countries hour by hour, and consider the difference between them
(price spread). Looking at Panel B, from a mean price point of view, we
can see that it would be profitable (leaving aside the transaction costs) to
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Panel A: Intra-day Prices
France Switzerland Germany
3 p.m. 3 a.m. 3 p.m. 3 a.m. 3 p.m. 3 a.m.
Mean 39.99 27.74 40.5 28.15 29.97 23.91
Std. Dev. 20.29 12.16 24.22 11.92 20.01 10.35
Max 295.00 120.00 185.00 139.80 209.00 200.00
Min −18.00 −10.00 −150.00 −18.90 −320.00 −85.00
Skewness 1.56 1.26 1.24 1.65 −0.68 −1.25
Kurtosis 8.01 6.57 9.71 8.95 27.41 9.58
ADF 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Jarque-Bera 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
# of obs. 39, 717 19, 280 23, 532 10, 475 364, 273 192, 447
Panel B: Intra-day Price Spread
France -
Switzerland
Switzerland -
Germany
Germany -
France
3 p.m. 3 a.m. 3 p.m. 3 a.m. 3 p.m. 3 a.m.
Mean 3.63 1.22 −2.77 −4.29 −0.86 3.07
Std. Dev. 16.56 13.61 20.98 16.33 19.62 15.22
Max 295.00 120.00 252.01 139.80 130.00 60.00
Min −87.90 −139.80 −175.00 −60.00 −252.01 −86.00
Skewness 2.68 0.22 0.04 0.44 −0.73 −0.07
Kurtosis 26.48 15.03 11.35 6.86 14.2 5.55
ADF 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Jarque-Bera 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
# of obs. 7, 158 5, 215 7, 158 5, 215 7, 158 5, 215
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of intra-day prices and price spreads for a peak (3
p.m.) and off-peak (3 a.m.) hour. The values for mean, standard deviation, maximum
and minimum are expressed in AC /MWh. We report the p-values of the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic, which indicate that the null hypothesis of unit
root is rejected in favor of the mean reverting alternative in all cases. We also report
the p-values for the Jarque-Bera test, which reject, in all cases, the null hypothesis of
normality.
send electricity from Switzerland to France, from Switzerland to Germany,
and from Germany to France when trading contracts with delivery at 3 p.m.,
from France to Germany when trading contracts with delivery at 3 a.m.. If
we have a look at the results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on
prices and spreads, we can see that the unit root hypothesis is rejected in all
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cases, with a p-value equal or lower than 0.01%, favoring the mean reverting
alternative. The Jarque-Bera test, again with p-values lower than 0.01% in
all cases, suggests that both prices and spreads are far from being normally
distributed. The same results, both for the ADF test and the Jarque-Bera
one, hold for all single peak and off-peak hours.
4.3 Econometric Analysis
Using data for all intraday contracts traded on EPEX, we first look for pat-
terns in the dynamics of prices and flows of electricity across the different
countries, and choose a sub-set of locations where to base our trading strat-
egy. Specifically, the locations we choose are Germany, Switzerland and
France, because all of them are interconnected with each other, and thus the
agent can buy or sell electricity in all directions in each of these three mar-
kets. We want to understand how the volumes of electricity traded can affect
the electricity price over time, so to calibrate the agent’s trading strategy
accordingly.
We run the multivariate robust OLS (ordinary least squares) regression in
(4.3.1), where the dependent variables are the price increments over 1 hour
of trading, and the explanatory variables are the total volumes per trading
hour, traded in all possible directions. The price increment is computed over
1 hour because the market is not a particularly liquid one, so that the effects
of the different trades are evident over a somewhat appreciable amount of
time.
∆P t = β1Vol
SF
t−1 + β2Vol
FS
t−1 + β3Vol
GS
t−1 + β4Vol
SG
t−1 + β5Vol
GF
t−1 + β6Vol
FG
t−1
+ β7Vol
OF
t−1 + β8Vol
FO
t−1 + β9Vol
OS
t−1 + β10Vol
SO
t−1 + β11Vol
OG
t−1 + β12Vol
GO
t−1 + εt ,
(4.3.1)
with
P t =
P FtP St
PGt
 ,
where F stands for “France”, S for “Switzerland”, G for “Germany”, and O
for “other country”, so that P Ft is the French price of electricity at time t,
P St is the Swiss one, and P
G
t is the German one; Vol
FS
t represents the sum
of all volumes of the transactions hour by hour where the market area Buy
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is France and the market area Sell is Switzerland, and so on. Finally, εt is a
vector of normally distributed error terms.
Then, we also run (4.3.1) using a stepwise algorithm. In a stepwise regres-
sion, the choice of the predictive variables is carried out by an algorithm.
In fact, the algorithm adds or removes terms of the multilinear model based
on their statistical significance, so that the final choice of regressors has the
maximum explanatory power.
We expect that, when the agent buys a certain amount of electricity in
France to sell it in Switzerland, the French price will be negatively affected
(in the sense that it will increase), while the Swiss one will proportionally
decrease. When buying electricity, the agent is reducing the electricity sup-
ply, so that the price will increase. On the other hand, selling electricity
will increase the supply, and prices will drop. The estimated coefficients
of (4.3.1) confirm this intuition, both with the multivariate regression and
with the stepwise one (see, for example, Table 4.5). We observe that, when
the dependent variable is ∆P Ft , most of the times β1 is negative, while β2
is positive, β5 is negative, while β6 is positive, β7 is negative, while β8 is
positive (when significant). If the dependent variable is instead ∆P St , most
of the times β1 is positive, while β2 is negative, β3 is negative, while β4 is
positive, β9 is negative, while β10 is positive (when significant). Coherently,
when the dependent variable is ∆PGt , most of the times β3 is positive, while
β4 is negative, β5 is positive, and so is β12, while β6 is negative, and so is β11
(when significant) (see Appendix C.1 for the complete results both for the
multivariate and the stepwise regressions).
Moreover, the coefficients referring to the same country pair are statistically
different one from the other when taken in absolute value (β1 6= −β2, for
example).
These results show that flows of electricity between two locations affect the
prices of the two locations that receive/send electricity and also affect the
prices of other locations which are not directly receiving electricity. That
is, the price increment relative to a specific country is not only affected
by the trades between that country and another, but is also affected by
electricity trades happening somewhere else in the system. We label these
effects “cross-border permanent impacts”. When constructing our optimal
trading strategy, we take into account the presence of these price impacts,
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∆PFt ∆P
S
t ∆P
G
t
VolSFt 0 0 0
VolFSt 0.0032
∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗∗ 0
VolGSt 0 0 0.0064
∗∗∗
VolSGt 0 0 0
VolGFt 0 0.0009
∗∗∗ 0
VolFGt 0 −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0060∗∗∗
VolOFt 0 0 −0.0013∗∗∗
VolFOt 0.0022
∗∗∗ 0 −0.0038∗∗∗
VolOSt 0 0 0
VolSOt 0 0 0
VolOGt 0 0 −0.0068∗∗∗
VolGOt 0 0 0.0052
∗∗∗
Table 4.5: OLS robust estimates, obtained using the stepwise algorithm, for con-
tracts with delivery at 3 p.m.. Dependent variables: ∆PFt , ∆P
S
t , ∆P
G
t .
∗∗∗ = p <
0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
because the agent’s trades are going to permanently affect the price in a way
proportional to the quantity traded.
The β coefficients in (4.3.1) give an indication of the magnitude and sign
of the permanent price impacts that trading activity in each direction has on
the price of electricity in each country of the interconnected network.
In our setup, we assume these impacts to be linear in the agent’s speed of
trading.
4.3.1 Co-integrated electricity prices
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the behavior of electricity prices dis-
plays pecularities that make its statistical features different from those of
other financial assets. When high demand brings on stream less efficient
power generation sources, the electricity price exhibits spikes and jumps,
and, depending on different electricity usage throughout the year, it also
displays a marked seasonal component.
For this reason, before using the price data, we need to de-seasonalize
them. We model the seasonal component f(t) using sinusoidal functions
with different periodicities (in this case, annual, semi-annual and weekly
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with different centers) (see for example Lucia and Schwartz (2002), Seifert
and Uhrig-Homburg (2007) and Pilipovic (1998)). We thus get
f(t) = b1 sin(2pit) + b2 cos(2pit)+b3 sin(4pit) + b4 cos(4pit)
+ b5 sin(104pit) + b6 cos(104pit) + b7 .
(4.3.2)
The seasonality parameters are calibrated using OLS, and Figure 4.2 reports
the results of the calibration for intra-day contracts with delivery at 3 p.m..
In our set up, because the three countries are interconnected and, as shown
in the previous section, there is presence of cross-border effects, we model
the prices as co-integrated. Co-integration was first defined in Engle and
Granger (1987) as the property according to which a combination of two
non-stationary processes can be stationary, and has since then found several
applications, from macroeconomic analysis to fund management and portfolio
selection. The core of the idea is to take advantage of the co-movement among
the co-integrated stochastic variables in a dynamic specification framework.
In our model, the drift of the stochastic process we use to model electricity
prices is composed of an idiosyncratic component, which only affects the sin-
gle country, and a systemic one, which is a proxy for all the common drivers
of the electricity price in all countries, and which is what causes them to
co-move. This common component is the co-integration factor. In this re-
spect, our specification is similar to that of Cartea and Jaimungal (2016a),
but differs from their one in the nature of the assets traded (electricity prices
versus IT stocks), in the definition of the co-integration factor, in that we
add a jump component to the dynamics, and most importantly, in that we
consider the permanent impacts that cross-border trading has on the elec-
tricity price, as found in the previous section. Our electricity price dynamics
is thus defined as:
dP kt =
(
θk +
n∑
i=1
δkiα
i
t
)
dt+
n∑
i=1
σkidW
i
t + J(ψk, ξk)dΠ(λk) , (4.3.3)
where (P kt )t>0 is the de-seasonalized price of electricity in country k at time
t (from now on, we will simply refer to the de-seasonalized electricity price
as ‘electricity price’), θk is the idiosyncratic component of the drift, δki are
country-specific constants, W it are standard Brownian motions independent
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(a) Historical closing prices with seasonality - hour 3 p.m.
(b) Residuals - hour 3 p.m.
Figure 4.2: Historical (4.2a) and de-seasonalized (4.2b) electricity price for contracts
with delivery at 3 p.m. for each country in the sample. The three sub-figures in each
panel show the prices for, from top to bottom, France, Switzerland and Germany.
The red solid line in 4.2a represents the calibrated seasonality function f(t). Prices
are expressed in AC /MWh.
of each other, and σki are the elements of the Cholesky decomposition of the
instantaneous variance-covariance matrix of electricity prices. Jumps arrive
as a Poisson process Π with intensity λk and have a normally distributed
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jump size with mean ψk and standard deviation ξk. Moreover,
αit =
n∑
j=1
aijP
j
t (4.3.4)
is the co-integration factor for country i, where aij are constants. We can
thus see that the price of electricity in each country also depends on the
electricity price in the other ones.
Eq. (4.3.3) can be rewritten in matrix notation as
dPt = (θ −Φ Pt) dt+ σ dWt + J(ψ,ξ)dΠ(λ) . (4.3.5)
Here Φ is a n× n matrix and Φ = −∆ ·A , where
∆ =
δ11 · · · δ1n... . . . ...
δn1 · · · δnn
 and A =
a11 · · · a1n... . . . ...
an1 · · · ann
 .
Since we defined a different co-integration factor for each of the three coun-
tries, Φ contains exactly three positive eigenvalues, and this ensures that the
three price processes display mean reverting behavior. For reasons that will
be clear later on in what follows, we impose the restriction that Φ has to be
a symmetric matrix.
The parameters in (4.3.5) can be estimated through Maximum Likelihood
Estimation (MLE). In order to do this, we first need to find the multivariate
density function of the price process. Thus, we perform an Euler discretiza-
tion on (4.3.5). To discretize the jump component, we assume that, within
a small time interval dt, the increment of the Poisson process behaves like
a Bernoulli random variable. This means that, over the interval dt, we can
have at most one jump. Thus, in presence of jumps, we get
P t+1 = θ + (1n −Φ)P t + σεt + (ψ + ξεJ t)Y λ , (4.3.6)
where 1n is a n × n identity matrix, (εt)t and (εJ t)t are i.i.d. sequences of
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standard normal random variables, also independent of each other, and
Y λ =

Y λ11 0 · · · 0
0 Y λ22
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 Y λnn
 ,
with Y λkk ∼ Bern(λk) independent of Y λii ∀ k 6= i, k = 1, ..., n. We thus get
that the multivariate conditional density function is
f (P t+1|P t) =
∑
e∈E
[
n∏
i=1
λeii
(
1− λ1−eii
)]
( 2pi )−
n
2 |Ω + ξe |−
1
2
· e− 12 [P t+1−ψe+θ+(1n−Φ)P t]ᵀ(Ω+ξe)−1[P t+1−ψe+θ+(1n−Φ)P t] ,
(4.3.7)
where Ω = σσᵀ, and |Ω + ξe | is the determinant of Ω + ξe. Let E = {0, 1}n,
then, ∀ e ∈ E, ξe is the n×n diagonal matrix with elements (ξe)ii = ξ2ii ·ei and
(ξe)ij = 0 ∀ i 6= j. Similarly, ψe is a vector with n elements (ψe)i = ψi · ei.
A numerical maximization of the log-likelihood function returns the es-
timates reported in Table 4.6. Figure 4.3 shows simulated in-sample and
out-of-sample paths for the (non-deseasonalized) price process, both for a
peak (3 p.m.) and an off-peak (3 a.m.) hour.
4.4 Optimal trading strategy
In this section, we show how to build up on the previous section’s findings in
order to set up an optimal trading strategy. To do this, the agent’s trading
should not only be based on the price spreads observed over time among the
three interconnected countries, but also on the market impacts of electricity
flowing across the neighbouring locations.
4.4.1 Cross-border trading impacts on the electricity
price
We assume two different types of impact: permanent and temporary ones.
According to the previous section’s findings, the agents’ trading activity has
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(a) Historical and simulated prices - hour 3 p.m.
(b) Historical and simulated prices - hour 3 a.m.
Figure 4.3: Historical and simulated electricity price paths for contracts with deliv-
ery at a peak – 3 p.m. (4.3a), and an off-peak – 3 a.m. (4.3b), hour, for France (top
panels), Switzerland (middle panels) and Germany (bottom panels). The blue solid
line represents the historical price path, while the red one represents a single out-of-
sample price simulation. The gray area represents the 1st and 99th percentiles of all
in-sample simulations, while the black solid line is their mean. Prices are expressed
in AC /MWh.
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France Switzerland Germany
Φ
France
0.78 −0.14 −0.06
(2.62 · 10−146) (3.49 · 10−8) (0.03)
Switzerland
−0.14 0.76 −0.04
(3.49 · 10−8) (2.85 · 10−58) (0.06)
Germany
−0.06 −0.04 0.86
(0.03) (0.06) (6.99 · 10−27)
σ
France
11.95 0 0
(1.91 · 10−64) (-) (-)
Switzerland
10.28 4.60 0
(7.95 · 10−74) (2.06 · 10−9) (-)
Germany
7.12 2.26 10.04
(1.79 · 10−15) (0.07) (9.54 · 10−7)
θ
−1.26 −0.14 0.70
(0.03) (0.79) (0.39)
ψ
−7.07 2.60 25.00
(0) (6.53 · 10−87) (0)
diag(ξ)
68.31 57.79 99.84
(0) (0) (0)
λ
0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.76 (0.84) (0.79)
Table 4.6: Daily parameters of the multivariate price process in (4.3.5), estimated
via MLE against price data relative to contracts with delivery at 3 p.m.. P-values are
in parentheses.
a permanent impact on the price of electricity contracts. This is due to the
fact that buying (or selling) these contracts increases the demand (or supply)
of electricity in each country, thus causing upward (or downward) pressure
on prices. (For a further discussion on permanent price impacts, see Alfonsi
et al. (2010), Cartea and Jaimungal (2016b) and Cartea et al. (2016)).
We denote by ν = (ν t){0≤t≤T} the vector of the agent’s speed of trad-
ing for each trading direction. Since we are treating the three countries
as distinct markets, we consider trading in opposite directions across each
country couple as two separate positions. Moreover, the choice of keep-
ing 6 controls, rather than 3, is also motivated by the results of Section
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4.3. These show that the impact of trading in a specific direction is sta-
tistically different, in absolute value, from the impact of trading in the op-
posite direction. We thus get a vector of six elements, one for each trad-
ing direction: France-Switzerland, Switzerland-Germany, Germany-France,
Switzerland-France, Germany-Switzerland and France-Germany.
The permanent impact function on power prices is thus defined as:
gk(νt) = β
a
kν
ij
t + β
b
kν
ji
t + β
c
kν
iz
t + β
d
kν
zi
t + β
e
kν
jz
t + β
f
kν
zj
t , (4.4.1)
with i, j, z ∈ {France, Switzerland,Germany} and i 6= j 6= z. Of course,
with no trading activity, we get gk(0) = 0. The permanent impact β is
different for each country k, and the electricity price in each specific country
is affected by the flow of electricity in each trading direction in different
ways (this is why β is indexed by superscript). When the speed of trading
νij is positive, the agent, over a small time step ∆t, is buying in country i
a quantity of electricity νij∆t, and selling the same quantity in country j.
On the contrary, when νij is negative, the agent is buying contracts for νij∆t
MWh of electricity in country j to sell them in country i. Equivalently, in
matrix notation,
g(ν t) = Hν t , (4.4.2)
and, in our set-up, we define the vector of optimal controls as
νᵀ =
(
νSFt ν
FS
t ν
GS
t ν
SG
t ν
GF
t ν
FG
t
)
,
while H is the 3× 6 matrix of permanent impacts β. Specifically, the entries
H1,· represent the permanent impacts of all trades on the price of electricity
in France, H2,· represent those on the price of electricity in Switzerland, and
H3,· those on that of Germany. It is noteworthy to underline that these β
coefficients are the coefficients estimated in regression (4.3.1). Because of the
greater explanatory power of the regressors, we use the estimates obtained
by means of the stepwise algorithm, rather than those of the multivariate
regression. Since, as the results of the regression in (4.3.1) indicate, the flows
of electricity between two locations have a direct effect on the price electricity
of those two locations, but also an indirect effect on the electricity price in
all other locations, we include these impacts in the price dynamics (4.3.5),
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which becomes:
dPt = (θ −Φ Pt + g(ν t)) dt+ σ dWt + J(ψ,ξ)dΠ(λ) . (4.4.3)
The temporary impact is instead referred to the price the agent gets con-
textually to the market clearing. In fact, when her orders are executed, the
price she gets is a little worse than the quoted one, the one she saw before
her trading action. We define the 1 × 3 vector of temporary impacts on
power prices as ω, whose elements are country-specific parameters, so that
the (non-deseasonalized) price with temporary market impact is as follows:
P̂ kt =
{
P˜ kt + ωkν
kj
t when buying in k and selling in j
P˜ kt − ωkνjkt when selling in k and buying in j
, j 6= k ∧ ωk ≥ 0,
(4.4.4)
where {k, j} ∈ {France, Switzerland,Germany}. The execution price of elec-
tricity in country k at time t is denoted by P̂ kt , while P˜
k
t denotes the (non-
deseasonalized) quoted one, so that P˜ kt = P
k
t + f
k(t), with fk(t) equal to
the seasonal component of country k, in the form of Equation (4.3.2). In
such a way, if, for example, νFSt > 0 (ν
FS
t < 0), it means that, at time t, the
agent will buy (sell) electricity contracts in France (and sell (buy) them in
Switzerland), and the price P̂ Ft that she will pay (get) will be slightly higher
(lower) than the quoted price P˜ Ft she observed immediately before her trade.
Similarly, when νSFt > 0, the agent will sell electricity contracts in France
(and buy them in Switzerland), and the price P̂ Ft that she will get will be
slightly lower than the quoted price P˜ Ft . The temporary impact is partly due
to the fact that the agent is “walking the book” and partly to the fact that
the trading activity implies transaction costs.
4.4.2 Optimal cross-border trading strategy
The agent aims at maximizing, over a trading horizon T , her marginal cash
flows, here denoted by X. Her cash process at each time t is given by the sum
of all price spreads between each country couple, times the relative speed of
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trading. We thus get:
X(t,Pt, ν t) =
(
P̂ St − P̂ Ft
)
νFSt +
(
P̂ Ft − P̂ St
)
νSFt +
(
P̂Gt − P̂ St
)
νSGt
+
(
P̂ St − P̂Gt
)
νGSt +
(
P̂ Ft − P̂Gt
)
νGFt +
(
P̂Gt − P̂ Ft
)
νFGt .
(4.4.5)
Substituting (4.4.4) into (4.4.5), we get
X(t,Pt, ν t) =
(
P Ft − P St
) (
νSFt − νFSt
)− (ωF + ωS)(ν2t SF + ν2t FS)
+
(
P St − PGt
) (
νGSt − νSGt
)− (ωS + ωG)(ν2t GS + ν2t SG)
+
(
PGt − P Ft
) (
νFGt − νGFt
)− (ωF + ωG)(ν2t GF + ν2t FG)
+
(
fF (t)− fS(t)) νSFt + (fS(t)− fF (t)) νFSt
+
(
fS(t)− fG(t)) νGSt + (fG(t)− fS(t)) νSGt
+
(
fF (t)− fG(t)) νGFt + (fG(t)− fF (t)) νFGt . (4.4.6)
In matrix notation, this is equal to
X(t, P, ν) = νᵀBᵀP − νᵀΥν + νᵀf(t) , (4.4.7)
where
P ᵀ =
(
P F P S PG
)
,
B =
 1 −1 0 0 1 −1−1 1 1 −1 0 0
0 0 −1 1 −1 1
 ,
f(t) =

fF (t)− fS(t)
fS(t)− fF (t)
fS(t)− fG(t)
fG(t)− fS(t)
fF (t)− fG(t)
fG(t)− fF (t)

,
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and
Υ =

ωF + ωS 0 · · · 0
0 ωF + ωS 0 · · · ...
... 0 ωS + ωG 0 · · ·
0 ωS + ωG 0
0 ωF + ωG 0
0 · · · 0 ωF + ωG

.
Thus, her value function is
V (t,P) = sup
ν∈A
E t,P
[∫ T
t
X(u,Pu, νu) du
∣∣∣∣Pt = P] , (4.4.8)
where the set of admissible strategies A is defined as
A =
{(
ν t = (ν
ij
t )
i,j∈{F,G,S},i 6=j
)
t∈[0,T ]
progr. meas. and s.t. E
[∫ T
0
‖ν t‖2du
]
< +∞
}
.
Moreover, E t,P denotes the expectation computed when the process {Pν ;t,Pu , u ∈
[t, T ]} is the solution of Equation (4.4.3) with initial condition Pt = P and
control ν .
The dynamic programming principle suggests that (4.4.8) is the unique
solution to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
∂tV (t,P) + sup
ν∈A
[LνV (t,P) +X(t,P, ν t)] = 0 , (4.4.9)
where the infinitesimal generator Lν acts as follows
LνV (t,P ) = (θ −Φ Pt + νᵀtH ᵀ)VP (t,P ) +
1
2
Tr [ΩH ]
+
n∑
k=1
λk
∫ +∞
−∞
∆k(y)V (t,P)
1√
2piξk
e
−(y−ψk)2
2ξ2
k dy ,
where VP (t,P ) is the vector with elements
∂V
∂Pi
, Tr[·] denotes the trace opera-
tor and H is the Hessian of V , namely a matrix with elements Hi,j = ∂2V∂Pi∂Pj .
The operator ∆k(y)V (t,P), due to the jump part, acts as follows (cf. Cartea
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et al. (2015) and Øksendal and Sulem (2007)):
∆k(y)V (t,P) = V (t,P + y1k)− V (t,P) ∀ k ∈ {1, ..., n} ,
where the indicator function 1k is defined as
11 = (1, 0, · · · , 0)ᵀ , 12 = (0, 1, · · · , 0)ᵀ , · · · , 1n = (0, 0, · · · , 1)ᵀ .
Proposition 4.4.1. Given (4.4.9), the optimal speed of trading in feedback
control form is defined as
ν ∗t =
1
2
Υ−1 (H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t + f(t)) . (4.4.10)
and the HJB reduces to the following partial integro-differential equation
(PIDE):
0 = ∂tV (t,P) + LV (t,P)
+
1
4
[H ᵀVP (t,P ) +B
ᵀP t + f(t)]
ᵀ
Υ−1 [H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t + f(t)] ,
(4.4.11)
with
LV (t,P ) = (θ −Φ Pt)VP (t,P ) + 1
2
Tr [ΩH ]
+
n∑
k=1
λk
∫ +∞
−∞
∆k(y)V (t,P)
1√
2piξk
e
−(y−ψk)2
2ξ2
k dy .
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
We remark here that the second term in brackets in (4.4.10) can be seen as
a myopic trading strategy, simply based on the electricity price spread. The
first term is instead the added value given by acknowledging the permanent
impacts on prices. Finally, the third term is simply the seasonality spread
between each country couple. In what follows, we are going to label na¨ıve
strategy the simple strategy based on the price spread, namely
νnt =
1
2
Υ−1 (BᵀP t + f(t)) . (4.4.12)
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This is going to be the benchmark against which to compare the performance
of the optimal trading strategy ν ∗.
Now, in order to solve (4.4.11), we need to guess a solution. We expect the
value function to be a quadratic combination of prices. Thus, we propose
the following ansatz:
Proposition 4.4.2 (Solving the HJB.). The PIDE in (4.4.11) admits a so-
lution of the form
V (t,P) = A(t) +Dᵀ(t)P + PᵀE(t)P , (4.4.13)
where A(t), a scalar, and
D(t) =
D1(t)D2(t)
D3(t)
 , E(t) =
E11(t) E12(t) E13(t)E12(t) E22(t) E23(t)
E13(t) E23(t) E33(t)

are the solution of the a 10-ODEs system: specifically, E solves a matrix
Riccati equation, D solves a linear differential equation and A solves an in-
tegrable equation. Moreover, E(t) = Y (t)X(t)−1, with(
X(t)
Y (t)
)
= exp
[
(T − t)
(−1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ + Φ −H Υ−1H ᵀ
1
4
BΥ−1Bᵀ
(
1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ −Φ)ᵀ
)](
X(T )
Y (T )
)
,
(4.4.14)
and (
X(T )
Y (T )
)
=
(
I
E(T )
)
. (4.4.15)
The solution of D(t) is instead given by
D(t) = Xᵀ(t)−1D(T ) +
∫ t
0
[
X(t)−1
]ᵀ
Xᵀ(s)
[
2E(s)(θ + λ ◦ψ)
+ E(s)HΥ−1f (s) +
1
2
BΥ−1f (s)
]
ds , (4.4.16)
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product between two vectors, i.e. (λ ◦ ψ)i =
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λiψi ∀ i. Finally,
A(t) = A(T ) +
∫ T
t
1
4
(Dᵀ(s)H + f ᵀ(s)) Υ−1 (H ᵀD(s) + f (s)) + Tr [ΩE(s)]
+Dᵀ(s) (θ + λ ◦ψ) +ψᵀdiag(E(s)) (λ ◦ψ) + ξᵀdiag(E(s)) (λ ◦ ξ) ds .
(4.4.17)
where diag(E(t)) is a matrix with the elements on the main diagonal equal
to those on the main diagonal of E(t), and with all other elements equal to
zero, such that
diag(E(t)) =
E11(t) 0 00 E22(t) 0
0 0 E33(t)
 .
Moreover, the optimal controls are given by
ν ∗t = Υ
−1
(
1
2
H ᵀD(t) +H ᵀE(t)P t +
1
2
BᵀP t +
1
2
f(t)
)
. (4.4.18)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
We are now ready to close the gap between the original optimal control
problem of the agent in Equation (4.4.8) and the HJB equation (4.4.9). First
of all we need a technical lemma.
Lemma 4.4.1. For all ν ∈ A, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and for all initial conditions
P ∈ R3, the process Pν ;t,P is such that
Et,P
[
sup
t≤u≤T
‖Pν ;t,Pu ‖2
]
< +∞ .
Proof. First of all, we have that, for u ∈ [t, T ], Equation (4.4.3) has the
unique solution
Pν ;t,Pu = e
−(u−t)ΦPt +
∫ u
t
e−(v−t)Φ(θ +Hνv) dv +
∫ u
t
e−(v−t)Φ(σ dWt + J(ψ,ξ)dΠ(λ))
= P0;t,Pu +
∫ u
t
e−(v−t)ΦHνv dv .
94 4. Optimal cross-border electricity trading
Thus,
Et,P
[
sup
t≤u≤T
‖Pν ;t,Pu ‖2
]
≤ 2Et,P
[
sup
t≤u≤T
‖P0;t,Pu ‖2
]
+ 2Et,P
[
sup
t≤u≤T
∥∥∥∥∫ u
t
e−(v−t)ΦHν v dv
∥∥∥∥2
]
.
Since the process P0;t,P is solution of Equation (4.4.3) with zero control,
which satisfies the assumptions of Protter (2003, Theorem V.67), the first
term in the right-hand side is finite. For the second term, we have
Et,P
[
sup
t≤u≤T
∥∥∥∥∫ u
t
e−(v−t)ΦHν v dv
∥∥∥∥2
]
≤ Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖e−(v−t)ΦH‖2‖ν v‖2 dv
]
≤
≤ sup
t≤v≤T
‖e−(v−t)ΦH‖2Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖ν v‖2 dv
]
,
which is finite, as [t, T ] 3 v → e−(v−t)ΦH is continuous and bounded and ν
is admissible.
Theorem 4.4.1 (Verification Theorem). Assume that, for a certain t ∈
[0, T ], the matrix-valued function t → E(t) defined in Equation (4.4.14) is
the unique solution of Equation (C.8) on [t, T ]. Then the function V in
Equation (4.4.13), solution of the HJB equation (4.4.9), coincides with the
value function (4.4.8). Moreover, the process ν ∗ defined in Equation (4.4.10)
is the optimal control for the problem (4.4.8).
Proof. The proof is basically a check on the more general result in Fleming
and Soner (1993, Theorem III.8.1). In fact, we already know that V is a
classical (i.e., C1,2) solution of the HJB equation (4.4.9). Thus, it follows that
V (t,P) ≥ E t,P
[∫ T
t
X(u,Pu, νu) du
]
∀ ν ∈ A, provided that the Dynkyn
formula
Et,P[V (T,PT )] = V (t,P) + Et,P
[∫ T
t
LνV (u,P u) du
]
(4.4.19)
holds. To prove this, first of all we notice that the integral to the right-hand
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side is well defined. In fact, since V is bilinear in P, we have that
|LνV (u,P)| ≤ C(1 + ‖P‖2 + ‖P‖ · ‖ν‖)
for a suitable C. This implies that
Et,P
[∫ T
t
|LνV (u,P u)|du
]
≤ Et,P
[∫ T
t
C
(
1 + ‖Pu‖2 + ‖Pu‖ · ‖νu‖
)
du
]
≤
≤ C(T − t) + CEt,P
[∫ T
t
‖Pν ;t,Pu ‖2du
]
+CEt,P
[∫ T
t
‖Pν ;t,Pu ‖2du
]
· Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖νu‖2du
]
,
where the third term comes from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Thus, it
turns out that the sum above is finite from the fact that
Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖Pν ;t,Pu ‖2du
]
≤ (T − t)Et,P
[
sup
u∈[t,T ]
‖Pν ;t,Pu ‖2
]
< +∞ , (4.4.20)
by Lemma 4.4.1, and from ν ∈ A.
To prove the Dynkyn formula, we notice that the Ito¯ formula applied to
V (t,Pνt ) gives
V (T,PνT ) = V (t,P) +
∫ T
t
LνV (u,P νu)du+ I1T + I2T , (4.4.21)
where
I1u :=
∫ u
t
(D(v) + 2E(v)P νv )
ᵀσ dWv ,
I2u :=
∫ u
t
(D(v) + 2E(v)P νv−)
ᵀJ(ψ,ξ) dΠ(λ) .
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By the Ito¯ isometry, (I1u)u∈[t,T ] is a martingale. In fact,
Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖(D(v) + 2E(v)P νv )ᵀσ‖2dv
]
≤
≤ ‖σ‖2Et,P
[∫ T
t
(‖D(v)‖2 + 2‖E(v)P νv )‖2)dv
]
≤
≤ ‖σ‖2(T − t) sup
v∈[t,T ]
‖D(v)‖2 + 2‖σ‖2 sup
v∈[t,T ]
‖E(v)‖2Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖P νv ‖2dv
]
,
where the sup are finite, as D and E are continuous on [t, T ], and the latter
term is finite by Equation (4.4.20); thus, I1 is a martingale. For I2, we invoke
Protter (2003, Theorem V.66), for which, for all u ∈ [t, T ], we must check
the finiteness of
Et,P
[∥∥∥∥∫ u
t
J(ψ,ξ) dΠ(λ)
∥∥∥∥2
]
=
3∑
k=1
Et,P
 Πku∑
`=1
Jk`
2 =
=
3∑
k=1
Et,P
Et,P
 Πku∑
`=1
Jk`
2 ∣∣∣∣∣∣Πku
 = 3∑
k=1
Et,P
 Πku∑
`,m=1
Et,P
[
Jk` J
k
m
] =
=
3∑
k=1
Et,P
[
Πku(ψ
2
k + ξ
2
k)
]
=
3∑
k=1
λk(u− t)(ψ2k + ξ2k) < +∞ .
Since v → (D(v)+2E(v)P νv−)ᵀ is left-continuous, thus predictable, by Protter
(2003, Theorem V.66) there exists a K > 0 such that
Et,P
[
sup
u∈[t,T ]
|I2u|2
]
≤ K
∫ T
t
Et,P[‖D(u) + 2E(u)P νu−‖2]du ,
where the right-hand side is finite, in analogy with what we did with I1. This
means that also I2 is a martingale: then, taking the expectation of Equation
(4.4.21) gives the Dynkyn formula (4.4.19). As announced, this implies that
V (t,P) ≥ E t,P
[∫ T
t
X(u,Pu, νu) du
]
∀ ν ∈ A .
To prove the second part, we already have that ν ∗(t,P) defined in Equation
(4.4.10) is a maximizer of the HJB equation (4.4.9). Thus, we only need
to check that the process (ν ∗(t,Pt))t ∈ A. Given that it is progressively
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measurable by construction, we only need to check its square integrability:
Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖ν ∗(u,Pu)‖2du
]
=
=
1
4
‖Υ‖−2Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖H ᵀ(D(u) + 2E(u)Pu) +BᵀPu + fᵀ(u)‖2 du
]
≤
≤ CEt,P
[∫ T
t
(1 + ‖Pu‖2)du
]
,
for a suitable C. This is because D, E and f are continuous functions
of time u ∈ [t, T ]. Again, by Lemma 4.4.1 and arguments analogous to
those used before, we can conclude that Et,P
[∫ T
t
‖ν ∗(u,Pu)‖2 du
]
< +∞ and
(ν ∗(t,Pt))t ∈ A, which implies the second part of the verification theorem.
4.5 Empirical performance
To showcase the strategy’s performance, we first run 10,000 simulations of
the multivariate price process using the parameters estimated above, for each
day and for a trading horizon of 1 year. We use the solution (4.4.14) to the
matrix Riccati equation in Appendix C.2, along with (4.4.16) and (4.4.17),
to compute the six optimal controls for each run. Finally, the agent’s cash
process X is computed by taking the mean over the 10,000 runs.
The mean of all 10,000 paths for each optimal control is depicted for each
day in Figure 4.4, both when trading a peak hour (3 p.m.) and an off-peak
one (3 a.m.). The figure showcases a comparison between the controls paired
by country pair (left panels) and a comparison between each control and the
relative na¨ıve strategy (right panels). We note here that the optimal controls
for each country pair assume values that are quite similar in absolute value
for each given day, although not exactly one the opposite of the other.
Figure 4.5 instead shows the cumulative cash process obtained when trad-
ing a peak (Figure 4.5a, upper panel) and an off-peak (Figure 4.5b, upper
panel) hour, both using the optimal trading strategy (dashed blue lines), or
the na¨ıve one (dashed red line), as well as the difference between the two
(blue area). Moreover, the bottom panels of Figure 4.5a and 4.5b depict
the cumulative cash process broken down with respect to the three bilateral
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transmission lines.
Overall, Figure 4.5 shows how, at t = T , the optimal trading strategy
outperforms the na¨ıve one, and this holds for all hourly contracts, as we can
see in Figure 4.8. Specifically, the marginal gains with respect to the strategy
purely based on the price spread are in the range of AC 50,000 to AC 4,351,000
after 1 year of trading. Trading in contracts with delivery at 7 p.m., 9 a.m.
and 7 a.m. returns the highest yield at T = 365, with profits respectively
about 24%, 16% and 16% higher than those obtaied with the na¨ıve strategy.
On the other hand, trading in contracts with delivery at 2 p.m., 12 p.m.
and 11 a.m. gives the least considerable improvement, with a performance
of respectively 0.6%, 0.9% and 1.5% more with respect to the na¨ıve strategy.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 6 t = 8
0 −1, 893.34 −3, 511.36 −3, 203.81 −947.37 7, 886.19 2, 3780.21
t = 10 t = 15 t = 20 t = 100 t = 200 t = 300 t = 365
43, 224.3 94, 291.27 140, 853.19 623, 671.06 1, 158, 672.06 2, 123, 017.42 4, 351, 132.31
Table 4.7: Additional gains (in AC ) obtained when trading hour 7 p.m. using the
optimal trading strategy over the na¨ıve one. The incremental profits are shown for
different times t (expressed in days), until the end of the trading horizon, T = 365.
It is also interesting to observe the evolution of the cumulative cash flows
over the trading period. As we mentioned, trading hour 7 p.m. leads to the
best marginal gains at t = T . Table 4.7 shows the value of the integral of
the cash flows at different points in time t. It is worth noticing how, at the
beginning of the trading period, the optimal strategy actually fell below the
gains obtained using the na¨ıve strategy. This means that, at the beginning
of the trading period, it is optimal to actually go against the sensible trading
direction. It can be conjectured that this serves to the purpose of widening
the price spread even more, in order to profit from this later on, de facto
acting as a speculative trading strategy.
However, it is worth stressing that these results strongly depend on the
choice of the temporary impact parameters. These are the only parameters
we cannot estimate. The results presented above were obtained using a
temporary impact vector ω =
[
0.01 0.01 0.01
]
. This choice is motivated
by the conjecture that these parameters are mainly due to transaction costs,
and they represent a sort of fee applied to each transaction νt. Nevertheless,
to assess their actual impact on the overall performance of the strategy, we
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Figure 4.4: Optimal controls ν∗ paired by country pair (left panels) and compared
with the relative na¨ıve strategy (right panels), with a trading horizon T = 365 days.
Upper panels show the results when trading a peak hour (3 p.m.), and bottom panels
depict those when trading an off-peak hour (3 a.m.).
conduct a sensitivity analysis. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the results.
Specifically, Figure 4.6 shows how the marginal gains at t = T of the opti-
mal strategy over the na¨ıve one change depending on the different magnitudes
of ω and on different model horizons. In particular, we let ω = ω0 ·(K factor),
where ω0 =
[
0.02 0.02 0.02
]
, and K factor ∈ [0.1; 10]. In such a way, we can
observe how the marginal performance (in log10 scale) of the optimal trad-
ing strategy (that is, log10 (V
∗(T )− V n(T ))) changes when the temporary
impact factors ωk vary by two orders of magnitude, from −1 to −3. More-
over, on the y-axis, we can also see how the performance depends on the
model horizon T , with T ∈ [30; 365]. The results show that the marginal
performance is increasing in T , and, obviously, decreasing in the temporary
impacts. Moreover, it is always positive, showing that the optimal trad-
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(a) T = 365 days, ω = [ 0.01 0.01 0.01 ]. Trading hour 3 p.m.
(b) T = 365 days, ω = [ 0.01 0.01 0.01 ]. Trading hour 3 a.m.
Figure 4.5: Cumulative cash flows obtained when trading in contracts with delivery
at 3 p.m. (4.5a), and in contracts with delivery at 3 a.m. (4.5b). The blue dashed
lines in (4.5a) and (4.5b), upper panels, represent the cumulative cash flows obtained
using the optimal trading strategy, while the red dashed lines in (4.5a) and (4.5b),
upper panels, those obtained using the na¨ıve trading strategy. The solid yellow, red
and blue lines depict the profits resulting from trading in contracts between Germany-
Switzerland, Germany-France and France-Switzerland, respectively, using the optimal
strategy (left bottom panels of (4.5a) and (4.5b)), or the na¨ıve one (right bottom
panels of (4.5a) and (4.5b)).
ing strategy always outperforms the benchmark, for all trading horizons and
temporary impact vectors considered. Finally, the heat maps in Figure 4.7
show similar results, depicting V ∗(T ) and V n(T ) on separate graphs.
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Figure 4.6: Analysis of sensitivity to the trading horizon T and to the vector of
temporary impacts ω. The marginal gains (in AC , expressed in log10 scale) of the
optimal trading strategy over the na¨ıve one at t = T (i.e., log10 (V
∗(T )− V n(T )))
are depicted when trading hour 3 p.m. (left panel) and hour 3 a.m. (right panel).
T ∈ [30; 365], whileω = ω0 ·(K factor), whereω0 =
[
0.02 0.02 0.02
]
, and K factor ∈
[0.1; 10].
4.6 Conclusions
Using econometric tools, we have shown statistical evidence of cross-effects
on the price of electricity in neighbouring countries, due to electricity flows
across interconnected locations. We built on this result to set up an opti-
mal trading strategy, based not only on the price spreads observed over time
among the selected interconnected countries, but also on the market impacts
caused by the flows of electricity among them. Using the aforementioned
econometric analysis findings, we modeled the joint dynamics of electric-
ity prices as including both temporary and permanent impacts of electricity
trades, as well as driven by a common co-integration factor. Finally, using
optimal control techniques and the dynamic programming principle, we de-
fined the optimal trading strategy for an agent trading in intra-day electricity
contracts.
The results of the empirical analysis evidence a considerable improvement
of our strategy over a na¨ıve strategy purely based on the price spread, and
the main sources of profits of our strategy derive from considering the co-
movement of electricity prices through co-integration, and the direct and
indirect impacts of the cross-border electricity flows on the electricity price.
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Figure 4.7: Analysis of sensitivity for trading in contracts with delivery at 3 p.m.
(left panels) and at 3 a.m. (right panels). The upper panels depict the cumulative cash
flows obtained with the optimal trading strategy over 1 year of trading when varying
ω, with ω = ω0 · (K factor), where ω0 =
[
0.02 0.02 0.02
]
, and K factor ∈ [1; 10].
The remaining panels are heat maps depicting the level of the value function at time
T , obtained when trading with the optimal trading strategy (middle panels), or with
the na¨ıve one (bottom panels), depending on the model horizon T ∈ [30; 365], and on
the K factor ∈ [0.1; 10].
Finally, it is worth noticing that there are a number of directions of fu-
ture research to improve our model. Firstly, as Kiesel and Paraschiv (2016)
suggest, intraday prices adjust to the forecasting errors in renewables, thus
a possible extension to this work would be to improve the regression speci-
fication (4.3.1), used to estimate the direct and indirect price impacts, with
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additional explanatory variables. Secondly, the literature on price impacts
is scarce as for electricity markets, but it is rich as for stock markets. This
stream of literature (for instance, Engle and Dufour (2000) and Hasbrouck
(1991)) makes use of order book data to provide an estimate of price impacts
of trades. If we were to obtain such data relatively to the intra-day electricity
market, we could build from those works to improve the estimation proce-
dure. Finally, in this chapter we only analyzed how interconnecting countries
affects the level of electricity prices. A possible extension would be to also
analyze how cross-border trades affect the price volatility. It is reasonable to
think that adding interconnector capacity lowers price volatility. Including
this effect in the model could further improve it.
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Figure 4.8: Cumulative cash flows (in AC ) obtained using the optimal strategy (solid
black line) and the na¨ıve one (dashed black line) for all hourly contracts, over 365
days of trading. The gray boxed area shows the percentage improvement at T = 365
days of the optimal strategy over the na¨ıve one. ω = [ 0.01 0.01 0.01 ].
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4.7 Appendix C
C.1 Econometric analysis results
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00
(1) 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0012 −0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0006 −0.0003
(2) 0.0006 −0.0002 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0013∗ 0.0004
(3) −0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0011∗ −0.0001 0.0001
(4) 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.0005
(5) −0.0004 −0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0008
(6) −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0018∗ 0.0007 0.0001 −0.002 −0.0027∗∗
07:00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00
(1) 0.0006 −0.0001 −0.001∗∗ −0.0009∗ −0.0003 −0.0021∗∗∗
(2) 0.0005 0.0001 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0005
(3) −0.0008 −0.0008 −0.0004 0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0007
(4) −0.0003 0.007∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(5) −0.0014 −0.0008 0.00 −0.0007∗ 0.0003 0.0023∗∗∗
(6) 0.0009 −0.0001 0.0005 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0001
13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00
(1) −0.0030∗∗∗ −0.0009∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(2) 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗ 0.0006 0.0007∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗
(3) −0.0003 −0.0012∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0007 −0.0004 0.0018∗∗∗
(4) 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗
(5) 0.0014∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0010∗ 0.0010∗∗ −0.0001
(6) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0015∗∗ −0.0008 −0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0012∗∗
19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(1) −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗
(2) −0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
(3) −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 −0.0001
(4) 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
(5) −0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0002 −0.0005 0.0017∗∗∗
(6) −0.0124∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
Table C.1: Mutivariate OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PFt . Explana-
tory variables: VolGFt−1 (1), Vol
GS
t−1 (2), Vol
FG
t−1 (3), Vol
FS
t−1 (4), Vol
SG
t−1 (5), Vol
SF
t−1 (6).∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.2: Mutivariate OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PFt . Explanatory variables:
VolGOt−1 (7), Vol
OG
t−1 (8), Vol
FO
t−1 (9), Vol
OF
t−1 (10), Vol
SO
t−1 (11), Vol
OS
t−1 (12).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(7) −0.0011∗∗ −0.0004 0.0007∗ 0.00 −0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0010∗∗∗
(8) 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗ 0.0002 0.00 −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0007∗ 0.0002
(9) 0.0014∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.00 0.0008 0.0008 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗
(10) −0.0079∗∗∗ −0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0011 −0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗
(11) 0.0042∗ −0.0009 −0.0011 −0.0006 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0081∗∗∗
(12) −0.0048∗ 0.0013 −0.0012 0.0006 −0.0008 −0.0006 0.0027 −0.0056∗∗∗
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(7) 0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0002
(8) 0.0008∗ 0.0006 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0009∗∗ −0.0009∗ −0.0007 −0.001∗
(9) 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗
(10) −0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0009
(11) −0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ −0.0019 −0.0073∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗ −0.0036∗∗
(12) −0.009∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0026 0.0015 −0.0006 0.001 0.0061∗∗∗
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(7) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0003 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0007∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗
(8) −0.0001 −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0008∗∗ 0.00 −0.0009∗∗
(9) 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗
(10) −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0006
(11) 0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗ 0.0029∗ −0.0041∗∗ −0.0005 −0.006∗∗∗
(12) 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0026 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0022∗ −0.0022
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.3: Mutivariate OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PSt . Explanatory variables:
VolGFt−1 (1), Vol
GS
t−1 (2), Vol
FG
t−1 (3), Vol
FS
t−1 (4), Vol
SG
t−1 (5), Vol
SF
t−1 (6).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(1) −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0004
(2) −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0007 0.0012 −0.0003 −0.0005 0.00 0.0002
(3) 0.0006 0.0005 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗ 0.0002 −0.001 −0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0005
(4) −0.0018∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ −0.0019∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0016 −0.0038∗∗∗
(5) 0.0005 −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0008 −0.001 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗ 0.0014∗∗
(6) −0.0001 0.0008 0.0004 0.0007 −0.0035∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0014
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(1) 0.0008∗ 0.00 0.0006 0.0010∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗∗
(2) 0.0003 0.0002 −0.0004 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0027∗∗∗
(3) 0.00 −0.0002 −0.0010 0.0011∗∗ −0.0014∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
(4) −0.0018∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0007∗ −0.0006∗
(5) 0.0004 −0.0008∗ −0.0008∗ 0.0004 0.0012∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0008 0.0109∗∗∗
(6) −0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0016∗∗ −0.0009 0.0001
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(1) 0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0004 0.0007∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.00 0.0001 0.0014∗∗
(2) −0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0006∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ −0.0004 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0004
(3) −0.0005 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0004 0.00 0.0003 −0.0003 0.0004
(4) −0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0010∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0012∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0013∗∗∗
(5) −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007∗ −0.0005
(6) 0.0005 −0.0004 0.0014∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0005 0.0010∗ −0.0038
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.4: Mutivariate OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PSt . Explanatory variables:
VolGOt−1 (7), Vol
OG
t−1 (8), Vol
FO
t−1 (9), Vol
OF
t−1 (10), Vol
SO
t−1 (11), Vol
OS
t−1 (12).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(7) 0.0009∗∗ 0.0006 0.0006∗ −0.0003 −0.0002 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗ −0.0006∗
(8) −0.0013∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0004 0.00 −0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004
(9) 0.0004 −0.001 −0.0002 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0004
(10) 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.00 0.0006 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.00
(11) 0.0002 −0.0010 −0.0036 0.0054∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ −0.0021 −0.0029 −0.0016
(12) −0.0001 −0.0006 −0.0003 −0.003 −0.0014 −0.0019 −0.0035 0.0005
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(7) −0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0004 −0.001∗∗∗
(8) 0.0002 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.00 −0.0023∗∗∗
(9) 0.0011 0.0016∗∗ 0.0001 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0002 −0.0005 0.0004
(10) 0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0001 −0.0015∗∗ 0.0010 −0.0013∗ 0.0001 −0.0032∗∗∗
(11) 0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0007 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.0029∗ 0.0035∗ −0.003∗
(12) −0.0036∗∗ −0.0132∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0003 0.0006 −0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0043∗∗∗
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(7) 0.00 0.0008∗∗∗ −0.0002 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.0001 0.0004 0.0006∗∗
(8) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0006 0.0009∗∗
(9) 0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0012∗∗ −0.0008 0.0002 −0.0002
(10) 0.0044∗∗∗ −0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0011∗ 0.0003 0.00 0.0008
(11) 0.003∗ −0.0019 0.0025∗ 0.0035∗∗ 0.0001 0.0018 −0.0010 −0.0054∗∗∗
(12) 0.0013 −0.0036∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗ 0.0008 −0.0028∗∗ 0.0003 −0.0009
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.5: Mutivariate OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PGt . Explanatory variables:
VolGFt−1 (1), Vol
GS
t−1 (2), Vol
FG
t−1 (3), Vol
FS
t−1 (4), Vol
SG
t−1 (5), Vol
SF
t−1 (6).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(1) −0.0013∗ −0.0012∗ 0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗ −0.0016∗∗∗
(2) 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0011∗ 0.0029∗∗∗
(3) −0.0017∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0005 0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0003
(4) −0.003∗∗∗ −0.0013 0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0001
(5) −0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0052∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗∗ −0.0086∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗
(6) −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0010 −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0072∗∗∗ −0.0082∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗∗
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(1) −0.0006 −0.0005 −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗
(2) 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗
(3) 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗
(4) −0.005∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0010∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗ −0.0015∗∗∗ 0.00
(5) −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.0070∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.0030∗∗∗
(6) −0.0020∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0109∗∗∗
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(1) 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0004 0.0009
(2) 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(3) −0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0006∗ −0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0007∗ 0.0005 0.0010∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗
(4) 0.0001 0.0004 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0003 0.0017∗∗∗
(5) 0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0012∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗
(6) −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.6: Mutivariate OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PGt . Explanatory variables:
VolGOt−1 (7), Vol
OG
t−1 (8), Vol
FO
t−1 (9), Vol
OF
t−1 (10), Vol
SO
t−1 (11), Vol
OS
t−1 (12).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(7) 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(8) −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
(9) 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗ −0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗
(10) −0.0009 −0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0010 −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0010 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0015∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
(11) −0.0109∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.0058∗∗ 0.0001 0.0031 0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0197∗∗∗ −0.0163∗∗∗
(12) −0.0016 −0.0034∗ −0.0128∗∗∗ −0.0021 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(7) 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗
(8) −0.0066∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0064∗∗∗ −0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗
(9) −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗∗ −0.0063∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗
(10) 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
(11) −0.0016 −0.0063∗∗∗ −0.0184∗∗∗ −0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0034∗ −0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0106∗∗∗
(12) 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0095∗∗∗ −0.0075∗∗∗ −0.0003 0.0020 0.0044∗∗∗
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(7) 0.0007∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ −0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
(8) −0.0064∗∗∗ −0.0009∗ −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0062∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗ −0.0058∗∗∗
(9) −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0003 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0010∗
(10) −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0014∗∗∗ −0.0008∗ 0.0010∗ −0.0012∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗
(11) −0.0206∗∗∗ −0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ −0.0167∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗ −0.0026 −0.0088∗∗∗ −0.0237∗∗∗
(12) −0.0009 −0.0010 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.7: Stepwise OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PFt . Explanatory variables:
VolGFt−1 (1), Vol
GS
t−1 (2), Vol
FG
t−1 (3), Vol
FS
t−1 (4), Vol
SG
t−1 (5), Vol
SF
t−1 (6).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(1) 0 0 −0.0016∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 0 0 0 0 −0.0013∗∗ 0 0 0
(3) 0 0 0 0 −0.0012∗∗ 0 0 0
(4) 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0 0 0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗ 0 0.004∗∗∗
(5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6) −0.0018∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(1) −0.0016∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) 0 0 0 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗
(5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6) 0 −0.0050∗∗∗ 0 0 0 −0.0025∗∗ 0 0
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(1) 0 0 −0.0026∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 0 0 0.0016∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗ 0.0016∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗
(5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6) 0 −0.0021∗∗ 0 −0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0028∗∗∗ 0 −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0022∗∗∗
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.8: Stepwise OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PFt . Explanatory variables:
VolGOt−1 (7), Vol
OG
t−1 (8), Vol
FO
t−1 (9), Vol
OF
t−1 (10), Vol
SO
t−1 (11), Vol
OS
t−1 (12).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(7) 0 0 0.0005∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0039∗∗∗
(10) −0.0025∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ 0 0 0 −0.0011∗∗ 0 −0.0017∗∗
(11) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(12) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(9) 0.0041∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0.0017∗∗ 0 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗
(10) 0 0 −0.003∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗ −0.0028∗∗ 0 0
(11) 0 0 0 0.0048∗∗ 0 0 0 0
(12) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(7) 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗ 0
(8) 0 −0.0013∗∗ 0 0.0012∗∗ 0 0 0 0
(9) 0.0019∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0 0.0028∗∗∗ 0 0.0038∗∗∗ 0 0.0023∗∗∗
(10) 0 0 0 −0.0019∗∗ 0 −0.0015∗∗∗ 0 0
(11) 0 −0.0072∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0071∗∗∗
(12) 0 0 0 0 0 0.0028∗∗ 0 0
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.9: Stepwise OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PSt . Explanatory variables:
VolGFt−1 (1), Vol
GS
t−1 (2), Vol
FG
t−1 (3), Vol
FS
t−1 (4), Vol
SG
t−1 (5), Vol
SF
t−1 (6).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(1) 0.0004∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0004∗∗∗ 0
(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) −0.0006∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6) 0 0 0 0 −0.0016∗∗∗ −0.0012∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(1) 0 0 0.0012∗∗ −0.0019∗∗∗ 0 0 0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗
(2) 0 0 0 0.001∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0007∗∗ 0
(4) −0.001∗∗ 0 −0.0021∗∗∗ 0 0 0 −0.0007∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6) 0 0.0028∗∗ 0 0 0.0014∗∗ 0 0 0
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0002∗∗∗ 0
(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) −0.001∗∗∗ 0 0.0015∗∗∗ 0 0 0 −0.0005∗∗∗ 0
(5) 0 −0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗ 0 0 0 0 −0.0004∗∗
(6) 0 0.0009∗∗ 0 0 0.0005∗∗∗ 0 0.0005∗∗ 0
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.10: Stepwise OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PSt . Explanatory variables:
VolGOt−1 (7), Vol
OG
t−1 (8), Vol
FO
t−1 (9), Vol
OF
t−1 (10), Vol
SO
t−1 (11), Vol
OS
t−1 (12).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(7) −0.0003∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0.0002∗∗ −0.0003∗∗
(8) −0.0003∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(9) 0 0 0 0 0.0013∗∗∗ 0 0 −0.0007∗∗∗
(10) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(11) 0 0 −0.0018∗∗∗ 0 −0.0028∗∗∗ 0 0 0
(12) 0 0 0 0 −0.002∗∗∗ 0 −0.0017∗∗ 0
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(9) 0.0009∗∗ 0 0 0.0018∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
(10) 0 0 0 −0.0012∗∗ 0 0 −0.0013∗∗ 0
(11) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(12) 0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0134∗∗∗ 0 0 0 −0.0051∗∗∗ 0 0
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(7) 0 0 −0.0005∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(8) 0 0 0.0013∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(9) 0.001∗∗ 0 0.0009∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(10) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0007∗∗∗
(11) 0 0 0.0043∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0.0012∗∗∗ 0
(12) 0.0027∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.11: Stepwise OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PGt . Explanatory variables:
VolGFt−1 (1), Vol
GS
t−1 (2), Vol
FG
t−1 (3), Vol
FS
t−1 (4), Vol
SG
t−1 (5), Vol
SF
t−1 (6).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 0.0056∗∗ 0 0.0063∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗ 0 0.0042∗∗∗
(3) 0 0 −0.0047∗∗ 0 0 0 0.005∗∗ 0
(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.0079∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ 0 0 −0.007∗∗ −0.0117∗∗∗ −0.0068∗∗∗
(6) 0 0 0 −0.0105∗∗ 0 0 0 0
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005∗∗∗
(2) 0.0043∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0.0064∗∗∗ 0
(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.006∗∗∗ 0
(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) 0 −0.0029∗∗ −0.0040∗∗ 0 −0.0077∗∗∗ 0 0 −0.0060∗∗
(6) −0.0108∗∗∗ 0 0 0 −0.0065∗∗∗ 0 0 −0.0076∗∗∗
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(1) 0.0044∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2) 0.0026∗∗ 0 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
(3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5) 0 −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0052∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗∗
(6) 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0059∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗ 0
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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Table C.12: Stepwise OLS robust estimates. Dependent variable: ∆PGt . Explanatory variables:
VolGOt−1 (7), Vol
OG
t−1 (8), Vol
FO
t−1 (9), Vol
OF
t−1 (10), Vol
SO
t−1 (11), Vol
OS
t−1 (12).
01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 08:00
(7) 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0 0.0035∗∗∗ 0 0 0 0
(8) −0.0053∗∗∗ 0 −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ 0 −0.0032∗∗
(9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(10) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(11) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(12) 0 0 0 0 0 0.0169∗∗ 0.0248∗∗ 0
09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00
(7) 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(8) −0.006∗∗∗ 0 0 −0.004∗∗ 0 −0.0053∗∗ −0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0067∗∗∗
(9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0038∗∗ 0
(10) 0 0 0.006∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0
(11) 0 0 −0.0195∗∗ −0.0149∗∗ 0 0 0 0
(12) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00
(7) 0 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0 0.0024∗∗ 0.0026∗∗ 0
(8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0052∗∗∗
(9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(10) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(11) 0 −0.0144∗∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0
(12) 0 0 0 0.0152∗∗ 0 0.0083∗∗ 0 0
∗∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗∗ = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1.
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C.2 Proofs
Proof of Prop. 4.4.1
Since the argument of the sup in (4.4.9) is quadratic in ν , and ωk ≥ 0 ∀ k ∈
{F, S,G}, the sup attains a maximum. It is then trivial to obtain the first
order condition (FOC) for the vector of controls ν .
Substituting the feedback control forms of ν ∗ into (4.4.9), we get
0 = ∂tV (t,P) + LV (t,P)
+
[
1
2
Υ−1 (H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t + f(t))
]ᵀ
(H ᵀVP (t,P ) +B
ᵀP t + f(t))
−
[
1
2
Υ−1 (H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t + f(t))
]ᵀ
Υ
[
1
2
Υ−1 (H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t + f(t))
]
,
with
LV (t,P ) = (θ −Φ Pt)ᵀ VP (t,P ) + 1
2
Tr [ΩH ]
+
n∑
k=1
λk
∫ +∞
−∞
∆k(y)V (t,P)
1√
2piξk
e
−(y−ψk)2
2ξ2
k dy .
Collecting terms in
[
1
2
Υ−1 (H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t)
]ᵀ
, we obtain
0 = ∂tV (t,P) + LV (t,P)
+
1
4
[H ᵀVP (t,P ) +B
ᵀP t + f(t)]
ᵀ
Υ−1 [H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t + f(t)] .
Proof of Prop. 4.4.2
Using the ansatz (4.4.13) into (4.4.11), and collecting terms in powers of P
and constant terms, after some computations, we obtain the following system
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of 10 ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
0 =
1
2
∂tE11(t) +
(ηa1(t) + 1)
2 +
(
ηb1(t)− 1
)2
4(k1 + k2)
+
(ηc1(t)− 1)2 +
(
ηd1(t) + 1
)2
4(k1 + k3)
+
ηe1(t)
2 + ηf1 (t)
2
4(k2 + k3)
− Φ11E11(t)− Φ21E12(t)− Φ31E13(t) ,
0 =
1
2
∂tE22(t) +
(ηa2(t)− 1)2 +
(
ηb2(t) + 1
)2
4(k1 + k2)
+
ηc2(t)
2 + ηd2(t)
2
4(k1 + k3)
+
(ηe2(t) + 1)
2 +
(
ηf2 (t)− 1
)2
4(k2 + k3)
− Φ12E12(t)− Φ22E22(t)− Φ32E23(t) ,
0 =
1
2
∂tE33(t) +
ηa3(t)
2 + ηb3(t)
2
4(k1 + k2)
+
(ηc3(t) + 1)
2 +
(
ηd3(t)− 1
)2
4(k1 + k3)
+
(ηe3(t)− 1)2 +
(
ηf3 (t) + 1
)2
4(k2 + k3)
− Φ13E13(t)− Φ23E23(t)− Φ33E33(t) ,
0 = ∂tD1(t) +
Ba(t) (η
a
1(t) + 1) +Bb(t)
(
ηb1(t)− 1
)
2(k1 + k2)
+
Bc(t) (η
c
1(t)− 1) +Bd(t)
(
ηd1(t) + 1
)
2(k1 + k3)
+
Be(t)η
e
1(t) +Bf (t)η
f
1 (t)
2(k2 + k3)
+ E11(t)θ1 − Φ11D1(t) + E12(t)θ2 − Φ21D2(t) + E13(t)θ3 − Φ31D3(t) ,
0 = ∂tD2(t) +
Ba(t) (η
a
2(t)− 1) +Bb(t)
(
ηb2(t) + 1
)
2(k1 + k2)
+
Bc(t)η
c
2(t) +Bd(t)η
d
2(t)
2(k1 + k3)
+
Be(t) (η
e
2(t) + 1) +Bf (t)
(
ηf2 (t)− 1
)
2(k2 + k3)
+ E12(t)θ1 − Φ12D1(t) + E22(t)θ2
− Φ22D2(t) + E23(t)θ3 − Φ32D3(t) ,
0 = ∂tD3(t) +
Ba(t)η
a
3(t) +Bb(t)η
b
3(t)
2(k1 + k2)
+
Bc(t) (η
c
3(t) + 1) +Bd(t)
(
ηd3(t)− 1
)
2(k1 + k3)
+
Be(t) (η
e
3(t)− 1) +Bf (t)
(
ηf3 (t) + 1
)
2(k2 + k3)
+ E13(t)θ1 − Φ13D1(t) + E23(t)θ2
− Φ23D2(t) + E33(t)θ3 − Φ33D3(t) ,
0 = ∂tE12(t) +
(ηa1(t) + 1) (η
a
2(t)− 1) +
(
ηb1(t)− 1
) (
ηb2(t) + 1
)
2(k1 + k2)
+
(ηc1(t)− 1) ηc2(t) +
(
ηd1(t) + 1
)
ηd2(t)
2(k1 + k3)
+
ηe1(t) (η
e
2(t) + 1) + η
f
1 (t)
(
ηf2 (t)− 1
)
2(k2 + k3)
− Φ11E12(t)− Φ12E11(t)− Φ21E22(t)− Φ22E12(t)− Φ31E23(t)− Φ32E13(t) ,
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0 = ∂tE13(t) +
(ηa1(t) + 1) η
a
3(t) +
(
ηb1(t)− 1
)
ηb3(t)
2(k1 + k2)
+
(ηc1(t)− 1) (ηc3(t) + 1) +
(
ηd1(t) + 1
) (
ηd3(t)− 1
)
2(k1 + k3)
+
ηe1(t) (η
e
3(t)− 1) + ηf1 (t)
(
ηf3 (t) + 1
)
2(k2 + k3)
− Φ11E13(t)− Φ13E11(t)− Φ21E23(t)
− Φ23E12(t)− Φ31E33(t)− Φ33E13(t) ,
0 = ∂tE23(t) +
ηa3(t) (η
a
2(t)− 1) + ηb3(t)
(
ηb2(t) + 1
)
2(k1 + k2)
+
ηc2(t) (η
c
3(t) + 1) + η
d
2(t)
(
ηd3(t)− 1
)
2(k1 + k3)
+
(ηe2(t) + 1) (η
e
3(t)− 1) +
(
ηf2 (t)− 1
)(
ηf3 (t) + 1
)
2(k2 + k3)
− Φ12E13(t)− Φ13E12(t)
− Φ22E23(t)− Φ23E22(t)− Φ32E33(t)− Φ33E23(t) ,
0 = ∂tA(t) +
Ba(t)
2 +Bb(t)
2
4(k1 + k2)
+
Bc(t)
2 +Bd(t)
2
4(k1 + k3)
+
Be(t)
2 +Bf (t)
2
4(k2 + k3)
+D1(t)θ1
+D2(t)θ2 +D3(t)θ3 +
1
2
E11(t)λ1
(
σ2J1 + ψ
2
1
)
+
1
2
E22(t)λ2
(
σ2J2 + ψ
2
2
)
+
1
2
E33(t)λ3
(
σ2J3 + ψ
2
3
)
+
1
2
(
σ211 + σ
2
12 + σ
2
13
)
E11(t) +
1
2
(
σ221 + σ
2
22 + σ
2
23
)
E22(t)
+
1
2
(
σ231 + σ
2
32 + σ
2
33
)
E33(t) + (σ21σ11 + σ22σ12 + σ23σ13)E12(t)
+ (σ31σ11 + σ32σ12 + σ33σ13)E13(t) + (σ31σ21 + σ32σ22 + σ33σ23)E23(t) ;
where
Bx(t) =
3∑
i=1
hxiDi(t) , η
x
i =
3∑
j=1
hxjEij(t) .
and with terminal condition
A(T ) = D1(T ) = D2(T ) = D3(T ) = E11(T ) = E12(T ) = · · · = E33(T ) = 0 .
However, we were not able to find an explicit solution to the system written
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in this way. Instead, we decided to re-write the system in matrix form. Thus,
we get:
Vt = A
′(t) +D ′ᵀ(t)P +P ᵀE ′(t)P , (C.1)
VPi = Di +
∂·
∂Pi
n∑
j,k=1
EjkPjPk = Di +
n∑
j,k=1
Ejk
∂·
∂Pi
(PjPi) =
= Di +
n∑
j,k=1
Ejk (1j 6=k=iPj + 1i=j 6=kPk + 1i=j=k2Pi) =
= Di +
n∑
j=1
EjiPj +
n∑
k=1
EikPk
⇒ VP = D + (Eᵀ(t) +E(t))P = D + 2E(t)P , (C.2)
VPP = E
ᵀ(t) +E(t) = 2E(t) , (C.3)
where the last step both in (C.2) and in (C.3) follows from the fact that we
are assuming E(t) to be a symmetric matrix.
Inserting the derivatives (C.1)-(C.3) into the PIDE (4.4.11), we get
A′(t) +D ′ᵀ(t)P +P ᵀE ′(t)P + LV (t,P )
+
1
4
[H ᵀVP (t,P ) +B
ᵀP t + f(t)]
ᵀ
Υ−1 [H ᵀVP (t,P ) +BᵀP t + f(t)] =
= A′(t) +D ′ᵀ(t)P +P ᵀE ′(t)P + LV (t,P )
+
1
4
{H ᵀ [D + (Eᵀ(t) +E(t))P ] +BᵀP + f(t)}ᵀΥ−1·
· {H ᵀ (D + (Eᵀ(t) +E(t))P ) +BᵀP + f(t)} = 0 , (C.4)
where L is the infinitesimal generator obtained under the optimal control,
4.7 Appendix C 121
corresponding to
LV (t,P ) = (θ −Φ Pt)ᵀ VP (t,P ) + 1
2
Tr [ΩᵀHΩ ] +
∫ +∞
−∞
J ·∆V (t,P ) dy =
= (θ −Φ Pt)ᵀ [D + (Eᵀ(t) +E(t))P ] + 1
2
Tr [Ω (Eᵀ(t) +E(t)) ]
+
∫ +∞
−∞
J ·∆V (t,P ) dy =
= (θᵀ −Pᵀt Φᵀ) (D + 2E(t)P ) + Tr [ΩE(t) ] +
∫ +∞
−∞
J ·∆V (t,P ) dy ,
where, with a slight abuse of notation,∫ +∞
−∞
J ·∆V (t,P ) dy =
n∑
i=1
λi
∫ +∞
−∞
∆i(y)V (t,P)
1√
2piξi
e
−(y−ψi)2
2ξ2
i dy .
Jump part:
∆i(y)V (t,P) = V (t,P + y1i)− V (t,P) ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n} ,
where the indicator function 1i is defined as
11 = (1, 0, · · · , 0)ᵀ , 12 = (0, 1, · · · , 0)ᵀ , · · · , 1n = (0, 0, · · · , 1)ᵀ .
Thus, we have:
V (t,P + y1i) = A(t) +D
ᵀ(t)P +Di(t) y + P
ᵀE(t)P+
+ y1ᵀiE(t)P + P
ᵀE(t)y1i + y
2
1
ᵀ
iE(t)1i ,
and
∆i(y)V (t,P) = Di(t)y +
n∑
j=1
PjEij(t)y +
n∑
j=1
PjEji(t)y + Eii(t)y
2 =
= Di(t)y + 2
n∑
j=1
PjEij(t)y + Eii(t)y
2 , (C.5)
where the last step follows from the fact that we are assuming E(t) to be a
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symmetric matrix. Thus,∫ +∞
−∞
J ·∆V (t,P ) dy =
n∑
i=1
λi
∫ +∞
−∞
∆i(y)V (t,P)
1√
2piξi
e
−(y−ψi)2
2ξ2
i dy =
=
n∑
i=1
λi
[(
Di(t) + 2
n∑
j=1
PjEij(t)
)
ψi + Eii(t)
(
ξ2i + ψ
2
i
)]
,
(C.6)
where the last step follows from E(Y ) =
∫ +∞
−∞ yf(y) dy = ψ, and from
E(Y 2) = V ar(Y ) + E(Y )2 = ξ2 + ψ2. Finally, we get:∫ +∞
−∞
J ·∆V (t,P ) dy = [Dᵀ(t) + 2P ᵀE(t)] (λ ◦ψ) +ψᵀdiag(E(t)) (λ ◦ψ)
+ ξᵀdiag(E(t)) (λ ◦ ξ) , (C.7)
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product between two vectors, and diag(E(t))
is a matrix with the elements on the main diagonal equal to those on the
main diagonal of E(t), and with all other elements equal to zero, such that
diag(E(t)) =

E11(t) 0 · · · 0
0 E22(t) 0
...
... 0
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 Enn(t)
 . 
Now, collecting quadratic and linear terms of P and constant terms in
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(C.4), we obtain the following three equations:
0 = E ′(t) +
1
2
Eᵀ(t)H Υ−1Bᵀ +
1
2
BΥ−1H ᵀE(t)− 2ΦᵀE(t) +Eᵀ(t)H Υ−1H ᵀE(t)
+
1
4
BΥ−1Bᵀ
= E ′(t) +
1
2
Eᵀ(t)H Υ−1Bᵀ +
(
1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ
)ᵀ
E(t)−ΦᵀE(t)−ΦᵀE(t)
+Eᵀ(t)H Υ−1H ᵀE(t) +
1
4
BΥ−1Bᵀ
= E ′(t) +Eᵀ(t)
(
1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ −Φ
)
+
(
1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ −Φ
)ᵀ
E(t)
+Eᵀ(t)H Υ−1H ᵀE(t) +
1
4
BΥ−1Bᵀ ; (C.8)
0 = D ′(t) +Eᵀ(t)H Υ−1 (H ᵀD(t) + f (t)) +
1
2
BΥ−1 (H ᵀD(t) + f (t))
+ 2E(t)(θ + λ ◦ψ)−ΦᵀD
= D ′(t) +
(
1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ −Φ
)ᵀ
D(t) +Eᵀ(t)H Υ−1H ᵀD(t)
+ 2E(t)(θ + λ ◦ψ) +Eᵀ(t)HΥ−1f (t) + 1
2
BΥ−1f (t) ; (C.9)
0 = A′(t) +
1
4
(Dᵀ(t)H + f ᵀ(t)) Υ−1 (H ᵀD(t) + f (t)) + Tr [ΩE(t) ]
+Dᵀ(t) (θ + λ ◦ψ) +ψᵀdiag(E(t)) (λ ◦ψ) + ξᵀdiag(E(t)) (λ ◦ ξ) ,
(C.10)
with terminal condition
A(T ) = D(T ) = E(T ) = 0 .
The last step in (C.8) is where we need the restriction on Φ we previously
imposed when defining the price dynamics. In fact, if and only if Φ is a
symmetric matrix, we can apply Gombani and Runggaldier (2013) and solve
the matrix Riccati equation (C.8), writing the solution to E(t) as follows:
E(t) = Y (t)X(t)−1 , (C.11)
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where X and Y satisfy the following linear differential equation:
∂
∂t
(
X
Y
)
=
(
1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ −Φ H Υ−1H ᵀ
−1
4
BΥ−1Bᵀ − (1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ −Φ)ᵀ
)(
X
Y
)
, (C.12)
with final condition (
X(T )
Y (T )
)
=
(
I
E(T )
)
. (C.13)
We thus get(
X(t)
Y (t)
)
= exp
[
(T − t)
(−1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ + Φ −H Υ−1H ᵀ
1
4
BΥ−1Bᵀ
(
1
2
H Υ−1Bᵀ −Φ)ᵀ
)](
X(T )
Y (T )
)
.
(C.14)
We thus have the solution for E(t), and, using a corollary in Gombani and
Runggaldier (2013), we can also compute the solution of D(t), which is given
by
D(t) = Xᵀ(t)−1D(T ) +
∫ t
0
[
X(t)−1
]ᵀ
Xᵀ(s)
[
2E(s)(θ + λ ◦ψ)
+ E(s)HΥ−1f (s) +
1
2
BΥ−1f (s)
]
ds .
Finally, we can solve (C.10):
A(t) = A(T ) +
∫ T
t
1
4
(Dᵀ(s)H + f ᵀ(s)) Υ−1 (H ᵀD(s) + f (s)) + Tr [ΩE(s)]
+Dᵀ(s) (θ + λ ◦ψ) +ψᵀdiag(E(s)) (λ ◦ψ) + ξᵀdiag(E(s)) (λ ◦ ξ) ds .
(C.15)
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